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THE IRON COLD OF THE MARSHALL TRILOGY 
MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER∗ 
 
This house is old.  For two hundred years  
a woman has risen in the iron cold 
of the deepest hour. 
—Louise Erdrich1 
 
Students of American Indian law cannot—and should not—escape 
from reading the three famous opinions of Chief Justice John Marshall that 
expounded for the first time in the halls of the United States Supreme Court 
the bases for federal Indian common law—the opinions we now refer to as 
the “Marshall Trilogy.”2  These foundational principles resonate today,3 
more than eighteen decades after the Court put them into words.  These 
words resonate in ways that the members of the Marshall Court could not 
have anticipated.4  In fact, a cursory review of the holdings and obiter dicta 
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1. LOUISE ERDRICH, The Ritual, in BAPTISM OF DESIRE: POEMS, at 77 (1989) (Harper 
Collins 2001). 
2. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831); 
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).  Professor Charles Wilkinson first described the cases 
as a trilogy. CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW: NATIVE 
SOCIETIES IN A MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 24 (1987) [hereinafter WILKINSON, 
AMERICAN INDIANS].  It is debatable that these three cases form a “trilogy” at all—Johnson has 
little to do with the Cherokee cases, Cherokee Nation and Worcester, decided almost a decade 
later—but they are intertwined in the literature and do form the basis for federal Indian law. 
3. See Robert T. Anderson, Criminal Jurisdiction, Tribal Courts and Public Defenders, 8 
KAN. J.L. PUB. POL’Y 139, 139 (2003); David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist 
Court’s Pursuit of States’ Rights, Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 
267, 273-74 (2001) (“foundations of Indian law”); Richard Monette, A New Federalism for Indian 
Tribes: The Relationship Between the United States and Tribes in Light of Our Federalism and 
Republican Democracy, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 617, 638 (1994); Raymond Cross, De-federalizing 
American Indian Commerce: Toward a New Political Economy for Indian Country, 16 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 445, 453 (1993). 
4. E.g., LINDSAY G. ROBERTSON, CONQUEST BY LAW: HOW THE DISCOVERY OF AMERICA 
DISPOSSESSED INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF THEIR LANDS 117-42 (2005) (arguing that Chief Justice 
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of these opinions by a modern student of American Indian law is enough to 
startle.  These three decisions, Johnson v. M’Intosh,5 Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia,6 and Worcester v. Georgia,7 written in the obtuse legalese of the 
day,8 identified the contours of American Indian law as they remain today 
in the modern era.  These opinions are the house in which American Indian 
advocates, leaders, and policymakers rise each morning—and it is a house 
filled with an iron cold of the deepest hour. 
This essay is an attempt to reexamine the Trilogy for its continuing 
relevance to students of modern American Indian law.  The law does not re-
main stagnant.  The law of the Marshall Court is no longer the only word in 
federal Indian law.9  But the pedagogical value of the Marshall Trilogy goes 
far beyond the mere holdings of the cases.  That is not to say the holdings 
are not significant—they are.  But, as Justice Baldwin wrote in Cherokee 
Nation, the “reasons” for the holdings are more significant than the 
holdings themselves.10  There are seven opinions in the Trilogy, with the 
three main opinions authored by Chief Justice Marshall.  The arguments, 
concepts, and notions in these opinions resonate today, about 170 years 
after the last of the decisions.  The argumentation of these Justices incor-
porates the seeds of the entire catalog of the current doctrine making up 
American Indian law.  The foundations of the current debates over plenary 
power,11 state authority in Indian Country,12 the special canon of 
 
Marshall did not envision the consequences of incorporating the Doctrine of Discovery into 
American constitutional law). 
5. 21 U.S. 543 (1823). 
6. 30 U.S. 1 (1831). 
7. 31 U.S. 515 (1832). 
8. Compare Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 562 (1832) (“Will these powerful 
considerations avail the plaintiff in error?  We think they will.”), with Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 
S. Ct. 2749, 2769 (2006) (“For these reasons, we deny the Government’s motion to dismiss.”). 
9. “Federal Indian law” is defined as “that body of law dealing with the status of the Indian 
tribes and their special relationship to the federal government, with all the attendant consequences 
for the tribes and their members, the states and their citizens, and the federal government.” 
WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 1 (4th ed. 2004).  See 
generally COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 1-3 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds., 
2005).  “Federal Indian law” includes statutes, treaties, regulations, and other codified law, as well 
as the federal common law interpreting these statutes and the constitutional common law arising 
out of the Court’s application of the constitution to Indian affairs. 
10. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 32 (Baldwin, J., concurring). 
11. Compare United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004) (holding that Congress has 
“plenary and exclusive” powers “to legislate in respect to Indian tribes”); Morton v. Mancari, 417 
U.S. 535, 551 (1974); United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1112-13 (9th Cir. 2006), with Lara, 
541 U.S. at 224 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The Court utterly fails to find any provision of the 
Constitution that gives Congress enumerated power to alter tribal sovereignty.”); Milner S. Ball, 
Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1 (arguing that Congress does not 
have plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian affairs).  See generally COHEN’S HANDBOOK 
OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 9, at § 5.02; Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in 
Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power 
       
2006] THE IRON COLD 629 
construction for Indian treaties,13 implicit divestiture,14 the trust doctrine,15 
the political status of Indians and Indian tribes,16 and others are all to be 
found within the Marshall Trilogy.  For a new student of federal Indian law, 
these three cases are a microcosm of the entire course to come.  It is fitting 
that these three cases often are the first cases confronted in the course,17 but 
it is somewhat disturbing to realize how little the debates have changed 
over the centuries. 
This essay reexamines the Marshall Trilogy for the pedagogical value 
that reading and understanding the Trilogy may have for students of federal 
 
over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 80-81 (2002) (describing as “uncertain” whether the 
Court will continue to validate Congressional plenary power). 
12. Compare Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 62 (1996) (under the Indian 
Commerce Clause, “the States . . . have been divested of virtually all authority over Indian 
commerce and Indian tribes.”), and Rice v. Olson, 324 US 786, 789 (1945) (“The policy of 
leaving Indians free from state jurisdiction and control is deeply rooted in the Nation’s history”), 
with McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 & n.8 (1973) (the Court relies less 
upon “platonic notions of Indian sovereignty” and looks more to relevant treaties and statutes in 
order to discern the limits of state power over Indian affairs).  See generally COHEN’S HANDBOOK 
OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 9, at § 6.01. 
13. Compare Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 196 (1999) 
(“[W]e interpret Indian treaties to give effect to the terms as the Indians themselves would have 
understood them.”), with Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 94 (2001) (“[C]anons 
are not mandatory rules.  They are guides that ‘need not be conclusive.’”) (quoting Circuit City 
Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 115 (2001)); Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 422-27 (1994) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority ignored the special canon of construction). 
See generally COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 9, at § 2.02. 
14. E.g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (“Their incorporation within the 
territory of the United States, and their acceptance of its protection, necessarily divested them of 
some aspects of the sovereignty which they had previously exercised.”).  See generally John P. 
LaVelle, Implicit Divestiture Reconsidered: Outtakes from the Cohen’s Handbook Cutting Room 
Floor, 38 CONN. L. REV. 731 (2006). 
15. E.g., United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465 (2003); Seminole 
Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942). 
In carrying out its treaty obligations with the Indian tribes the Government is 
something more than a mere contracting party.  Under a humane and self-imposed 
policy which has found expression in many acts of Congress and numerous decisions 
of this Court, it has charged itself with moral obligations of the highest responsibility 
and trust.  Its conduct, as disclosed in the acts of those who represent it in dealings 
with the Indians, should therefore be judged by the most exacting fiduciary standards. 
Id.  See generally COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 9, at § 5.05. 
16. E.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974) (“Resolution of the instant issue turns 
on the unique legal status of Indian tribes under federal law and upon the plenary power of 
Congress, based on a history of treaties and the assumption of a ‘guardian-ward’ status, to 
legislate on behalf of federally recognized Indian tribes.”).  See generally Gloria Valencia-Weber, 
Racial Equality: Old and New Strains of American Indians, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 333 (2004); 
Carole Goldberg, American Indians and “Preferential” Treatment, 49 UCLA L. REV. 943 (2002); 
Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Not “Strictly” Racial: A Response to “Indians as Peoples,” 39 UCLA 
L. REV. 169 (1991). 
17. See ROBERT N. CLINTON, CAROLE E. GOLDBERG, & REBECCA TSOSIE, AMERICAN 
INDIAN LAW: NATIVE NATIONS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 57-61, 65-69, 76-85 (4th ed. 2005); 
DAVID H. GETCHES, CHARLES F. WILKINSON, & ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 63-68, 104-25 (5th ed. 2005). 
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Indian law.  Part I is an introduction to the Trilogy.  Part I also argues that 
the modern Supreme Court gives little precedential weight to the Trilogy.  
Part II identifies the major Indian law doctrines that find their origin stories 
within the holdings and dicta of the Trilogy.  The Trilogy introduced the 
notions of federal plenary power over Indian affairs, canons of Indian treaty 
construction, the trust relationship between Indians and tribes and the 
federal government, and much more.  Part III reexamines the Trilogy in 
light of modern ways of reading the law for students of American Indian 
law and finds that the Trilogy retains its importance, despite its categori-
zation as both canon and anti-canon.  Part IV concludes by identifying some 
of the dangers of reading too much into the Trilogy. 
I. THE CONTEXT OF THE MARSHALL TRILOGY WITHIN EARLY 
SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE 
The Marshall Trilogy attracted attention from the watchers of D.C. 
politics when they were argued and decided, much more so than Indian law 
cases attract today.18  The Johnson argument “attracted spectators,” even 
though the day—February 15, 1823—was cold.19  The Worcester argu-
ments sent fifty or sixty Members of the House scrambling downstairs to 
the converted committee room where the Supreme Court sat in 1832.20   But 
the interest appeared to be fleeting—Indians and their problems were 
forgettable. “Injustice to [Indians] became of interest in politics only as it 
could be used to prejudice a political opponent in the eyes of the voters, and 
Indians had no votes.”21  Chief Justice Marshall, sometimes accused of 
harboring a soft spot for the plight of Indians and Indian tribes,22 issued his 
 
18. A recent major Indian law case, United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004), did attract 
some mention in the national news, see Linda Greenhouse, Court Upholds Tribal Power It Once 
Denied, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2004, at A12, but is not a “salient case,” defined as a case reported 
on the front page of the Times.  LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A 
PERSPECTIVE ON JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 156 (2006) (citing Lee Epstein & Jeffrey Segal, Measuring 
Issue Salience, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 66 (2000)). 
19. ROBERTSON, supra note 4, at 68. 
20. See DAVID LOTH, CHIEF JUSTICE: JOHN MARSHALL AND THE GROWTH OF THE 
REPUBLIC 363 (1949). 
21. Id. at 365-66; see also FRANCIS S. STITES, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFENDER OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 159 (1981) (“The rhetoric of opposition to [Indian] removal was more anti-
Jackson than pro-Indian. . . .  Neither states’ rights sentiment nor the democratic process for 
equality would tolerate Indian nations inside state borders or Indian exemption from state law.”). 
22. See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 586 (1823) (noting that the Indians of Kentucky 
had “maintained their title with as much persevering courage as was ever manifested by any 
people”); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 15 (1831) (“If courts were permitted to indulge 
their sympathies, a case better calculated to excite them can scarcely be imagined.”) (Marshall, 
C.J.); RICHARD C. BROWN, ILLUSTRIOUS AMERICANS: JOHN MARSHALL 214-15 (1968).  A letter, 
written in 1828, from Chief Justice Marshall to Justice Story provided: 
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opinions as a matter of political necessity more than his sympathy for 
Indians.23  In fact, for one commentator, the Chief Justice’s overall juris-
prudential views seemed to be driven more by fear of slave insurrections 
than the military capabilities of the weakened Indian tribes.24 
A. JOHNSON V. M’INTOSH 
Johnson held that Indians and Indian tribes did not have the authority 
to alienate land to any entity other than the American government.25 Chief 
Justice Marshall formally adopted the Doctrine of Discovery into federal 
common law26: 
This principle was, that discovery gave title to the government by 
whose subjects, or by whose authority, it was made, against all 
other European governments, which title might be consummated 
by possession. 
The exclusion of all other Europeans, necessarily gave to the 
nation making the discovery the sole right of acquiring the soil 
from the natives, and establishing settlements upon it.  It was a 
right with which no Europeans could interfere. It was a right which 
 
It was not until after the adoption of our present government that respect for our own 
safety permitted us to give full indulgence to those principles of humanity and justice 
which ought always to govern our conduct towards the aborigines when this course 
can be pursued without exposing ourselves to the most afflicting calamities.  That 
time . . . is unquestionably arrived, and every opposition now exercised on a helpless 
people depending on our magnanimity and justice for the preservation of their exis-
tence impressed a deep stain on the American character. 
Id.  See also LEONARD BAKER, JOHN MARSHALL: A LIFE IN THE LAW 732 (1974) (same). 
23. See ROBERT KENNETH FAULKNER, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF JOHN MARSHALL 48-49 
(1968). 
[T]he vacating of Indian claims to land [in Johnson] otherwise appropriated by 
American law could be painfully justified only as ‘indispensable’ to the American 
system, especially where ‘the property of the great mass of the community originates’ 
in those appropriations . . . .  In each case he qualified human liberty for the sake of 
short-run expediency, while believing in the long-run expediency, as well as justice, of 
liberty. 
Id. (quoting Johnson, 21 U.S. at 591).  See also DAVID ROBARGE, A CHIEF JUSTICE’S PROGRESS: 
JOHN MARSHALL FROM REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA TO THE SUPREME COURT 301-02 (2000) 
(“For Marshall, the [Worcester] decision was a victory on all counts . . . .  ‘In this decision, 
perhaps more than in any other,’ Charles F. Hobson has rightly concluded, [‘]the jurist went 
beyond strict legal necessity to make a pronouncement that trenched upon the political sphere.’”). 
24. See FAULKNER, supra note 23, at 58 (“It might well be that the greater generosity 
displayed to the Indians, compared to the slaves, was owing to Marshall’s belief that danger from 
the Indians was no longer to be expected, while the awful possibilities connected with Negro 
enslavement yet remained.”). 
25. 21 U.S. 543 (1823). 
26. In the description of the Trilogy that follows, larger block quotations will be used to help 
in retaining more of the context of the language of the opinions. 
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all asserted for themselves, and to the assertion of which, by 
others, all assented.27 
Chief Justice Marshall explained that Indians retained rights in the 
lands they occupied, but that those rights had been limited post-Discovery: 
In the establishment of these relations, the rights of the original 
inhabitants were, in no instance, entirely disregarded; but were 
necessarily, to a considerable extent, impaired.  They were admit-
ted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as 
just claim to retain possession of it, and to use it according to their 
own discretion; but their rights to complete sovereignty, as 
independent nations, were necessarily diminished, and their power 
to dispose of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever they 
pleased, was denied by the original fundamental principle, that 
discovery gave exclusive title to those who made it.28 
The federal government, according to the Chief Justice, held the preemption 
right, the right to extinguish Indian title via purchase or conquest, but also 
title to the Indian lands: 
The United States, then, have unequivocally acceded to that great 
and broad rule by which its civilized inhabitants now hold this 
country.  They hold, and assert in themselves, the title by which it 
was acquired.  They maintain, as all others have maintained, that 
discovery gave an exclusive right to extinguish the Indian title of 
occupancy, either by purchase or by conquest; and gave also a 
right to such a degree of sovereignty, as the circumstances of the 
people would allow them to exercise.29 
The Chief Justice justified the holding that Indians, unlike whites, had 
lesser rights to lands by suggesting that Indians would, over time, 
assimilate: 
The title by conquest is acquired and maintained by force. The 
conqueror prescribes its limits.  Humanity, however, acting on 
public opinion, has established, as a general rule, that the con-
quered shall not be wantonly oppressed, and that their condition 
shall remain as eligible as is compatible with the objects of the 
conquest.  Most usually, they are incorporated with the victorious 
nation, and become subjects or citizens of the government with 
which they are connected.  The new and old members of the 
 
27. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 573. 
28. Id. at 574. 
29. Id. at 587. 
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society mingle with each other; the distinction between them is 
gradually lost, and they make one people.  Where this incor-
poration is practicable, humanity demands, and a wise policy 
requires, that the rights of the conquered to property should remain 
unimpaired; that the new subjects should be governed as equitably 
as the old, and that confidence in their security should gradually 
banish the painful sense of being separated from their ancient 
connexions, and united by force to strangers.30 
Even so, he mocked the doctrine itself, stating that it was an 
“extravagant . . . pretension” for Euro-Americans to follow a rule that they 
may take significant property rights from indigenous peoples through 
discovery.31 
Professor Stuart Banner’s research shows in great detail that Chief 
Justice Marshall was wrong when he asserted that the Doctrine of 
Discovery always had been the general rule of acquiring Indian lands.32  In 
fact, Banner argues, the English government, as a matter of “overall English 
colonial land policy [pre-1763] . . . treated the Indians as owners of their 
land.”33  There is a certain forceful logic to Banner’s argument:  
Land was abundant and it was usually cheap.  Whether to buy an 
asset or simply seize it, in any context, is in large part an economic 
calculation, involving a comparison of the costs of each method.  
The less expensive the Indians’ land, the more likely the English 
were to buy it.34 
As more and more English speculators bought land from Indians, more and 
more land purchases began to rely on that chain of title: 
Finally, once the English began purchasing land from the Indians, 
it became very difficult as a political matter to refuse to recognize 
the Indians as property owners, because much of the English 
population derived title to their land from the Indians.  Many 
colonists had bought land either from the Indians directly or at the 
 
30. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 589. 
31. Id. at 591. 
32. See generally STUART BANNER, HOW THE INDIANS LOST THEIR LAND: LAW AND 
POWER ON THE FRONTIER 10-48 (2005). 
33. Id. at 12. 
34. Id. at 40; see also id. at 10. 
By the late seventeenth century, . . . English government officials settled on an answer 
[as to whether they could take Indian land or whether they had to buy it].  In principle, 
if not always in practice, the English recognized the Indians as the owners of North 
America.  If the English wanted Indian land, they would have to buy it. 
Id. at 10. 
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end of a chain of title that originated with the Indians.  To suggest 
that the Indians were not property owners would have been to up-
set the settled expectations of a large number of English property 
owners, who would suddenly have found their land titles open to 
question.35 
But after Johnson, the Doctrine of Discovery became a “well known fact.”36 
Professor Lindsay Robertson makes a compelling argument that the 
Doctrine of Discovery portion of the holding in Johnson was unnecessary to 
decide the case and that Chief Justice Marshall had an ulterior motive in 
extending the opinion to include that holding.37  Both land claims made by 
the petitioners in Johnson were prohibited by the British Proclamation of 
1763, the law of the land at that time of the two transactions (1773 and 
1775), and were, as a result, void ab initio.38  Professor Robertson shows 
that the Chief Justice expanded the question presented to extend the holding 
to land grants that would not have been covered under the 1763 procla-
mation.39  Moreover, the Chief Justice expanded the legal rule of preemp-
tion in Indian lands cases to include actual title: 
Preemption historically had meant no more than the exclusive 
right to engage in a particular purchase transaction.  The preemp-
tion right had not carried with it title to the land to which the right 
was claimed.  Marshall’s language—“that discovery gave title to 
the government by whose subjects . . . it was made, . . . which title 
might be consummated by possession,” thus worked a significant, 
if subtle, expansion, in the same way that his restatement of the 
question presented had drawn the discussion forward temporally.40 
Professor Robertson alleges that Chief Justice Marshall intended to lay the 
foundation in Johnson for a future case preserving the rights of war 
 
35. BANNER, supra note 32, at 41 (emphasis in original). 
36. Id. at 188 (quotation omitted); see also 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 2, at 4 (1833) (“That title was founded on the right of 
discovery, a right, which was held among the European nations a just and sufficient foundation, 
on which to rest their respective claims to the American continent.”). 
37. See ROBERTSON, supra note 4, at 95-116. 
38. See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 597-98 (1823). 
Most of the titles were derived from persons professing to act under the authority of 
the government existing at the time; and the two grants under which the plaintiffs 
claim, are supposed, by the person under whose inspection the collection was made, to 
be void, because forbidden by the royal proclamation of 1763. 
Id; ROBERTSON, supra note 4, at 95. 
39. See ROBERTSON, supra note 4, at 96 (“The key expansion Marshall worked at the outset 
was to covert the case from one about pre-Revolutionary War Indian land transactions to one 
about post-Revolutionary War Indian land transactions.”). 
40. See id. at 99 (quoting Johnson, 21 U.S. at 573) (italics in original). 
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veterans who received land grants from the State of Virginia in their 
western lands.41  As a condition for entering the Union, Virginia had to cede 
its claim to these western lands to the United States.42  Virginia, prior to the 
adoption of the Constitution and even the Articles of Confederation, had 
made land grants to returning war veterans—but those grants had not been 
reserved in the cession to the United States.43  In Johnson, the Chief Justice 
wanted to create law that would protect land interests granted by the states 
where the federal government subsequently guaranteed the same lands to 
Indian tribes.44  In effect, according to Professor Robertson, in order to 
protect these Virginia claimants, the Chief Justice cheated: 
Because [the petitioners’ counsel] had designed the case so as to 
limit material argument to the effect of the Proclamation of 1763, 
counsel offered no evidence of the history of public resolution of 
claims to Indian lands granted by states.  Had this history been 
presented, Marshall would have had at least to reckon with it. 
Expressing his conclusions in obiter dicta obviated this need.45 
In the opinion, the Chief Justice wrote,  
It has never been doubted, that either the United States, or the 
several States, had a clear title to all the lands within the boundary 
lines described in the treaty, subject only to the Indian right of 
occupancy, and that the exclusive power to extinguish that right, 
was vested in that government which might constitutionally 
exercise it.46   
The Virginia claimants received their compensation via an act of Congress 
in 1830.47 
The disastrous legacy of the Johnson decision in Indian Country and 
elsewhere has been articulated too many times to count.48  The impact on 
 
41. See id. at 83-89. 
42. See Gloria Valencia-Weber, The Supreme Court’s Indian Law Decisions: Deviations 
from Constitutional Principles and the Crafting of Judicial Smallpox Blankets, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. 
L. 405, 438-39 (2003). 
43. See ROBERTSON, supra note 4, at 86-87 (“Virginia had originally intended that enough 
lands be reserved from the cession of its western lands to Congress to satisfy the claims of 
Virginia soldiers in state and continental service left unsatisfied by the lands in Kentucky; when 
the cession was communicated to Congress, however, the militia claimants were erroneously 
omitted from the reservation.  Marshall was openly sympathetic.”). 
44. Id. at 106 (“Problems arose, however, when states granted Indian lands to individuals and 
the federal government subsequently guaranteed the same lands to the tribes by treaty.”). 
45. Id. at 110. 
46. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 584-85 (1823) (emphasis added). 
47. See ROBERTSON, supra note 4, at 117. 
48. E.g., Cleveland, supra note 11, at 34. 
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the Marshall Court’s federalism would arrive when the Georgia Supreme 
Court cited Johnson in affirming the Corn Tassel murder conviction49: 
In September 1830, the Georgia judicial convention upheld the 
legality of Georgia’s statutory claim of jurisdiction over the 
Cherokee Nation.  The validity of the assertion, the convention 
found, depended on the relation between Georgia and the 
Cherokees.  This relation depended in turn “upon the principles 
established by England towards the Indian tribes occupying that 
part of North America which that power colonized.”  These prin-
ciples had been “ably elucidated by the decision of the Supreme 
Court in the case of Johnson v. McIntosh.”50 
In that light, the Johnson holding, a property issue, contributed to the cir-
cumstances that would become the Cherokee cases, two major states’ rights 
decisions. 
Johnson had arisen from the ashes of an earlier case, Fletcher v. 
Peck.51  Fletcher adjudicated the rights of land speculators who had ac-
quired their interests in the Yazoo land fraud, in which all but one Georgia 
legislator had been bribed to enact bills to grant 35 million acres of land to 
 
M’Intosh established that U.S. authority over tribes, or at least the United States’ 
exclusive right to acquire Indian property, originated from two sources: colonial pre-
rogatives deriving from discovery, and the nature of Indians as savages and incom-
plete sovereigns.  Neither of these sources was based on the text of the Constitution.  
Instead, the U.S. powers resulting from discovery and the Indians’ aboriginal status 
were original, inherent powers, arising from international law.  By deriving U.S. 
authority over the Indians from an extraconstitutional source and suggesting that 
Congress’s exercise of the power was inappropriate for judicial review, Johnson v. 
M’Intosh laid the groundwork for the doctrine of inherent powers to come. 
Id. 
 See also John P. LaVelle, Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty Through Indian Participation in 
American Politics: A Reply to Professor Porter, 10 KAN. J.L. PUB. & POL’Y 533, 565 (2001) 
(referring to the Doctrine of Discovery as “a principle of white colonial supremacism traceable to 
the rise of Roman Catholic hegemony in medieval and renaissance Europe”); David E. Wilkins, 
Johnson v. M’Intosh Revisited: Through the Eyes of Mitchel v. United States, 19 AM. INDIAN L. 
REV. 159, 168 (1994). 
The end result, of course, was the enshrinement and institutionalization of a theory of 
tribal “subservience to the federal government.”  Put more pithily, M’Intosh’s “accep-
tance of the Doctrine of Discovery into United States law preserved the legacy of 
1,000 years of European racism and colonialism directed against non-Western 
peoples.  White society’s exercise of power over Indian tribes received the sanction of 
the Rule of Law in Johnson v. M’Intosh.” 
Id. (quoting in VINE DELORIA & CLIFFORD LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE 26 
(1983), and ROBERT WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT 317 
(1990)). 
49. Georgia v. Tassels, 1 Dud. 229 (Ga. 1830) (on file with author). 
50. See ROBERTSON, supra note 4, at 129. 
51. 10 U.S. 87 (1810). 
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these speculators for a couple pennies an acre.52  Much of the land at issue 
included lands owned and occupied by Indian tribes, including the 
Cherokee Nation.53  “An outraged Georgia electorate . . .  repealed the 
grants, signaling their contempt for their predecessors by ordering all 
records of the grants excised from the state’s public records and the original 
act of sale publicly burned.”54  The Fletcher Court, citing the Contracts 
Clause, invalidated the repeal of the land grant act,55 but with great 
reluctance, because the nascent Marshall Court had not yet reached a place 
where it felt comfortable invalidating acts of state legislatures.56  After 
 
52. See ROBERTSON, supra note 4, at 29-30; Horace H. Hagan, Fletcher v. Peck, 16 GEO. 
L.J. 1, 8 (1927) (“two cents an acre”).  According to Hagan: 
Georgia was the last of the thirteen original colonies to be settled, and was the least in 
population.  Its white citizenship was scarcely more than five thousand and to this 
sparseness of population there was added a bankrupt treasury and a people impov-
erished and unable to sustain any appreciable burden of taxation.  Any one of these 
reasons would be sufficient to start and support a legislative agitation for the sale of its 
western lands.  The combination of all of them was irresistible. 
Hagan, supra, at 7. 
53. See Robert J. Miller, The Doctrine of Discovery in American Indian Law, 42 IDAHO L. 
REV. 1, 60 (2005).  Hagan asserts that the Indian tribes in Georgia “were more than a match for 
the State of Georgia alone . . . .”  Hagan, supra note 52, at 8. 
54. ROBERTSON, supra note 4, at 30; see also Hagan, supra note 52, at 1-2 (reporting that the 
physical Act was laid “upon a fire, kindled, according to tradition, by a sun glass, in order that it 
might be said that no earthly flames, but fire from the heavens themselves had consumed the 
record of the inglorious transaction.”). 
55. See Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 137. 
Since, then, in fact, a grant is a contract executed, the obligation of which still con-
tinues, and since the constitution uses the general term contract, without distinguishing 
between those which are executory and those which are executed, it must be construed 
to comprehend the latter as well as the former.  A law annulling conveyances between 
individuals, and declaring that the grantors should stand seised [sic] of their former 
estates, notwithstanding those grants, would be as repugnant to the constitution as a 
law discharging the vendors of property from the obligation of executing their 
contracts by conveyances.  It would be strange if a contract to convey was secured by 
the constitution, while an absolute conveyance remained unprotected. 
Id.; Hagan, supra note 52, at 3 (“Fletcher v. Peck had already settled that a legislative grant is a 
contract and that, as such, it must be held inviolable by succeeding legislators.”).  Professor Akhil 
Amar suggests that Fletcher’s reliance upon the Contracts Clause, “leading to unjust enrichment 
of one contracting party, would seem antithetical to the basic spirit of the clause.” AKHIL REED 
AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 333 n.* (2005). 
56. See Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 130. 
That corruption should find its way into the governments of our infant republics, and 
contaminate the very source of legislation, or that impure motives should contribute to 
the passage of a law, or the formation of a legislative contract, are circumstances most 
deeply to be deplored.  How far a court of justice would, in any case, be competent, on 
proceedings instituted by the state itself, to vacate a contract thus formed, and to annul 
rights acquired, under that contract, by third persons having no notice of the improper 
means by which it was obtained, is a question which the court would approach with 
much circumspection.  It may well be doubted how far the validity of a law depends 
upon the motives of its framers, and how far the particular inducements, operating on 
members of the supreme sovereign power of a state, to the formation of a contract by 
that power, are examinable in a court of justice.  If the principle be conceded, that an 
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Fletcher, the Yazoo land speculators flocked to D.C. to petition Congress 
for compensation settlement in exchange for quieting of their interests in 
the lands.57  The petitioners in Johnson had analogous land claims in the 
Indiana Territory and sought compensation from Congress as well, but were 
unsuccessful.58  They turned to federal court litigation in an effort to im-
prove their chances of receiving compensation for their interests in the same 
manner as the Yazoo fraud beneficiaries.59  The outcome of the litigation—
rejection of the claim on the basis that the federal government retained the 
fee simple title in accordance with the Doctrine of Discovery60—generated 
fodder for debate over whether the federal government or the states held the 
title, even though Chief Justice Marshall made it clear that the federal 
government alone retained such rights.61  Moreover, as Professor Robertson 
argues, we will see that the Chief Justice had to return to Johnson in 
Worcester in order to stamp out the ambiguity over whether the federal 
government retained fee title to Indians lands or a preemption right, a 
critical question in the politics of Indian removal: 
 
act of the supreme sovereign power might be declared null by a court, in consequence 
of the means which procured it, still would there be much difficulty in saying to what 
extent those means must be applied to produce this effect. 
Id.  But see Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199 (1796) (invalidating a state statute without discussion of 
the Court’s authority to exercise judicial review over state statutes); William Michael Treanor, 
Judicial Review before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455, 555 (2005). 
Of course, judicial review had not won universal acceptance by 1803, and in the years 
after Marbury, there was certainly some opposition to the doctrine.  In particular, 
assertions of the power to invalidate statutes provoked controversy in the frontier 
states of Ohio and Kentucky in the early decades of the nineteenth century, and, in the 
1825 case of Eakin v. Raub, [12 Serq. & Rawle 330 (Pa. 1825)], Chief Justice Gibson 
in dissent wrote one of the classic critiques of the doctrine. (Gibson, C.J., dissenting). 
Treanor, supra, at 555 (internal citations omitted). 
57. See ROBERTSON, supra note 4, at 30-35. 
58. See id. at 36-44. 
59. See id. at 43 (“The question of the validity of the Illinois and Wabash land purchases 
would now finally become a judicial question.”). 
60. See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 573 (1823); ROBERTSON, supra note 4, at 75-76. 
61. See REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (Mar. 3, 
1827), reprinted in THE S. REV. 541, 552 (1828) (on file with the North Dakota Law Review)  
These decisions of the Supreme Court accord with what we have stated, excepted that 
they do not directly determine, whether the right of extinguishing Indian occupancy 
belongs to the  United States or to the State.  We are unable to form an idea of a 
sovereign State, which has not the power of legislating upon all matters within its 
jurisdiction. 
Id.  Compare id., with Johnson, 21 U.S. at 586 (“The ceded territory was occupied by numerous 
and warlike tribes of Indians; but the exclusive right of the United States to extinguish their title, 
and to grant the soil, has never, we believe, been doubted.”) (emphasis added); BANNER, supra 
note 32, at 214 (“John Marshall’s opinions had been less than clear as to whether the federal 
government could seize Indian land over the Indians’ objection, but the opinions had made it plain 
that a state could not do so.”) (emphasis in original). 
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The discovery doctrine had given Georgia and other eastern states 
a claim to the underlying fee title to the Indian lands within their 
borders.  This claim offered these states a basis for asserting a 
claim to jurisdiction over these lands.  The assertion, or threat of 
assertion, of a claim to state jurisdiction gave coercive force to the 
federal removal program.  To frustrate the removal program, John 
Marshall would have to return to the source.  In Worcester, there-
fore, he would dismantle the discovery doctrine by overruling that 
part of the doctrine assigning fee title to the discovering sovereign.  
Worcester was intended to prove Johnson’s undoing.62 
2. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia 
The holding in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia is simple—Indian tribes 
are not “foreign State[s]” as envisioned in Article III, section 2, paragraph 1 
of the Constitution.63  Chief Justice Marshall, writing for only one other 
Justice, wrote the lead opinion.64  Justices Johnson and Baldwin concurred 
in the outcome, writing opinions weighed against Indian interests.65  At the 
Chief Justice’s informal request,66  Justice Thompson wrote a dissent in 
which Justice Story concurred.67  It was unusual for the Marshall Court to 
render such a fragmented decision,68 evidence that the Marshall Court had 
begun to split apart as the Chief Justice aged and that the question of state 
authority in Indian Country was a contentious one. 
In the lead opinion, Chief Justice Marshall began by holding that 
Indian tribes were “states” (but not States of the Union) as envisioned by 
the Constitution,69 a question contested by the Justices concurring in the 
result.70  He wrote: 
 
62. ROBERTSON, supra note 4, at 133. 
63. 30 U.S. 1, 20 (1831) (Marshall, C.J.). 
64. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 15 (Marshall, C.J.). 
65. See id. at 20 (Johnson, J., concurring); id. at 31 (Baldwin, J., concurring). 
66. See STITES, supra note 21, at 162 (“Marshall was not happy with the result [in Cherokee 
Nation] . . . .  He encouraged Story and Thompson to write opinions explaining their dissent after 
the Court had risen.”). 
67. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 50 (Thompson, J., dissenting). 
68. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST 
HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888 195-96 (1985). 
69. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 16 (Marshall, C.J.). 
70. See id. at 25 (Johnson, J., concurring) (“Must every petty kraal of Indians, designating 
themselves a tribe or nation, and having a few hundred acres of land to hunt on exclusively, be 
recognized as a state?”); id. at 40 (Baldwin, J., concurring).  
The Cherokees were then dependants, having given up all their affairs to the regulation 
and management of congress, and that all the regulations of congress, over Indian 
affairs were then in force over an immense territory, under a solemn pledge to the 
inhabitants, that whenever their population and circumstances would admit they 
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The counsel for the plaintiffs have maintained the affirmative of 
this proposition with great earnestness and ability.  So much of the 
argument as was intended to prove the character of the Cherokees 
as a state, as a distinct political society, separated from others, 
capable of managing its own affairs and governing itself, has, in 
the opinion of a majority of the judges, been completely success-
ful.  They have been uniformly treated as a state from the settle-
ment of our country.  The numerous treaties made with them by 
the United States recognize them as a people capable of maintain-
ing the relations of peace and war, of being responsible in their 
political character for any violation of their engagements, or for 
any aggression committed on the citizens of the United States by 
any individual of their community.  Laws have been enacted in the 
spirit of these treaties.  The acts of our government plainly recog-
nize the Cherokee nation as a state, and the courts are bound by 
those acts.71 
In oft-quoted words, the Chief Justice then answered in the negative the 
question whether this Indian tribe could be considered a “foreign State”: 
Though the Indians are acknowledged to have an unquestionable, 
and, heretofore, unquestioned right to the lands they occupy, until 
that right shall be extinguished by a voluntary cession to our gov-
ernment; yet it may well be doubted whether those tribes which 
reside within the acknowledged boundaries of the United States 
can, with strict accuracy, be denominated foreign nations.  They 
may, more correctly, perhaps, be denominated domestic dependent 
nations.  They occupy a territory to which we assert a title inde-
pendent of their will, which must take effect in point of possession 
when their right of possession ceases.  Meanwhile they are in a 
state of pupilage.  Their relation to the United States resembles 
that of a ward to his guardian. 
They look to our government for protection; rely upon its kindness 
and its power; appeal to it for relief to their wants; and address the 
president as their great father.  They and their country are consi-
dered by foreign nations, as well as by ourselves, as being so com-
pletely under the sovereignty and dominion of the United States, 
that any attempt to acquire their lands, or to form a political 
 
should form constitutions and become free, sovereign and independent states on equal 
footing with the old component members of the confederation . . . . 
Id. at 40 (Baldwin, J., concurring).  
71. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 16 (Marshall, C.J.). 
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connexion with them, would be considered by all as an invasion of 
our territory, and an act of hostility.  These considerations go far to 
support the opinion, that the framers of our constitution had not the 
Indian tribes in view, when they opened the courts of the union to 
controversies between a state or the citizens thereof, and foreign 
states.72 
The derogation by the State of Georgia of the Cherokee Nation—a 
community with written laws and a functioning government,73 a sitting 
delegation in Congress,74 a treaty relationship with the United States,75 and 
a surplus of food76—would continue. 
While Johnson concerned states’ rights in a tangential manner, states’ 
rights were the leading issue in the Cherokee cases.  Southern states used 
the issue with the Cherokee Nation as a reason to confront the federal 
government and the Supreme Court, as Justice Breyer stated in a recent 
speech:  
But then North Carolina . . . said, “We will not give the United 
States customs duties that we owe them because we prefer to keep 
them.  Andrew Jackson woke up to the problem and he ended up 
saying to the governor of Georgia, You must release Worcester.”  
They had a negotiation and Worcester was let out of jail.77   
Yet, not knowing the immediate future, Chief Justice Marshall wrote that 
the 1832 Term in which the Worcester case was decided would focus more 
on the decisions of some Southern states to enact “nullification laws” by 
which the states asserted the authority to nullify federal tariffs and the 
 
72. Id. at 17-18 (Marshall, C.J.). 
73. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 75 (Thompson, J., dissenting) (“The laws of Georgia set 
out in the bill, if carried fully into operation, go the length of abrogating all the laws of the 
Cherokees, abolishing their government, and entirely subverting their national character.”); PHILIP 
BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 110-11 (1982) (“The Chero-
kees were forbidden to act as a government except for the sole purpose of ceding land.  White men 
were forbidden to reside on Indian lands without a license from the state . . . . ‘With the United 
States government no longer protecting them,’ one historian noted, ‘the Cherokees were subjected 
to harsh treatment.  Roving bands of whites looted Indian homes and the Cherokees, unable to 
testify in court, could do little to defend their property.”) (quoting Andrew Jackson, State Rightist: 
The Case of the Georgia Indians, 2 TENN. HISTORICAL SOCIETY 329, 225 (1952)). 
74. See Joseph C. Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in Law, Politics, and Morality, 21 
STAN. L. REV. 500, 505 (1969). 
75. See Treaty with the Cherokee, 7 Stat. 18 (1785), reprinted in 2 INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS 
AND TREATIES 8 (Charles J. Kappler ed., 1904); Treaty with the Cherokee, 7 Stat. 39 (1791), 
reprinted in 2 INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES, supra, at 29. 
76. See David M. Wishart, Evidence of Surplus Production in the Cherokee Nation Prior to 
Removal, 55 J. ECON. HIST. 120 (1995). 
77. Stephen G. Breyer, Reflections of a Junior Justice, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 7, 9 (2005). 
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Congressional debate over whether to reauthorize the Bank of the United 
States.78 
The Chief Justice, an old Federalist, walked a fine line in the 1832 
Term.79  As an aging Chief Justice whose Court was coming apart around 
him,80 he faced the prospect of losing the Court’s legitimacy in cases of 
judicial review of state court decisions and statutes.81  He also believed the 
Court’s preservation of the national government for his thirty-odd years of 
service was in danger of collapse—and the entire Constitution with it, as he 
famously wrote to Justice Story after the 1832 Term concluded: “I yield 
slowly and reluctantly to the conviction that our Constitution cannot last.”82 
3. Worcester v. Georgia 
Instead of the nullification laws or the Bank being the case wherein the 
Court would make a critical statement about federalism, by accident, the 
case was Worcester v. Georgia.83  The State of Georgia had enacted a series 
of laws that purported to assert jurisdiction over Indian lands and wipe out 
any competing government entity within the exterior boundaries of the 
State: 
 
78. See LOTH, supra note 20, at 357 (“To Marshall, the tariff issue seemed more dangerous 
to his principles.  For the South . . . was not professing itself willing to obey any protective tariff 
law.”); id. at 356 (quoting letter to his son; “This session of Congress is indeed particularly 
interesting.  The discussion on the tariff and on the Bank, especially, will, I believe call forth an 
unusual display of talents.”); see also R. Kent Newmyer, Chief Justice John Marshall’s Last 
Campaign: Georgia, Jackson, and the Cherokee Cases, 23 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 76, 78 (1999) (“The 
Indian cases were also Marshall’s final confrontation with the forces of states’ rights that had 
dogged his court for thirty years.”); Richard P. Longaker, Andrew Jackson and the Judiciary, 71 
POL. SCI. Q. 341, 348 (1956) (“While the President saw the Indian problem as a temporary one, 
the nullification issue presented a basic national crisis.”). 
79. Or, in Joseph Burke’s phrase, “An air of doom settled over the Supreme Court when the 
Justices gathered for the 1832 Term.”  Burke, supra note 74, at 500. 
80. See R. KENT NEWMYER, THE SUPREME COURT UNDER MARSHALL AND TANEY 87 
(Kenneth M. Stamp ed., Thomas Y. Crowell Co. 1968) (asserting that Marshall’s final term (1833) 
“reinforced his mounting conviction that the Court he knew was gone”; and that the final years of 
the Marshall Court were “hampered by internal division, vacancies, and sickness”); Newmyer, 
Chief Justice Marshall’s Last Campaign, supra note 78, at 79 (“The appeance of new Justices . . ., 
along with the growing independence of old ones . . ., introduced a new spirit of personal 
divisiveness and doctrinal uncertainty. . . .  [Marshall] was, for example, barely able to hold a 
majority in the important case of Craig v. Missouri (1830), although the issue of paper money and 
the Contract Clause appeared to have been definitely settled.”). 
81. But see NEWMYER, supra note 80, at 87 (“But [Worcester] was ignored by the state and 
left unenforced.  The Indians . . . packed up for the brutal trek . . . across the Mississippi.  The 
Court’s future seemed almost as bleak.”). 
82. LOTH, supra note 20, at 366; JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A 
NATION 519 (1996); STITES, supra note 21, at 165; Stephen G. Bragaw, Thomas Jefferson and the 
American Indian Nations: Native American Sovereignty and the Marshall Court, 31 J. SUP. CT. 
HIST. 155, 155-56 (2006). 
83. 31 U.S. 515 (1832). 
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Inspired by the rhetoric of states’ rights and encouraged by the 
clamor for Indian lands on which gold had recently been dis-
covered, Georgia in 1828 and 1829 enacted a series of laws the 
distributed the Cherokee territory to several counties and declared 
that . . . Georgia law would be enforced within this territory and all 
Indian customs and laws would be null and void.  These laws also 
denied Indians the right to testify in cases involving whites and 
punished any person or groups who tried to prevent Indians from 
emigrating from the State.84 
After Georgia put its laws into motion by prosecuting a Cherokee Indian for 
a murder in Cherokee territory, the Court granted certiori to hear the case, 
but the State defied the Court by executing the defendant a few days after 
receiving the order.85  Following the execution of George Corn Tassel: 
The Georgia legislature resolved that “the interference by the chief 
justice of the supreme court of the United States, in the adminis-
tration of the criminal laws of this state, is a flagrant violation of 
her rights.”  The governor was directed to “disregard any and 
every mandate and process . . . purporting to proceed from the 
chief justice or any associate justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States.”86 
But history shows that, in deciding Worcester the way he did, the Chief 
Justice put the president, a political adversary, in a vise, though Marshall 
 
84. Burke, supra note 74, at 503.  The common understanding is disputed that the motivation 
for the enactment of these anti-Indian laws was “lust” for the Indian lands or gold.  E.g., Rennard 
Strickland, Yellow Bird’s Song: The Message of America’s First Native American Attorney, 29 
TULSA L.J. 247, 247, 257 (1993); LOTH, supra note 20, at 359.  Some claim that Georgia 
policymakers were motivated by the need for large tracts of land to grow cotton.  See BAKER, 
supra note 22, at 733; BOBBITT, supra note 73, at 108. Others claim the Georgia policymakers 
were motivated by the need to cut through Cherokee territory for a route from the Atlantic to the 
Tennessee River.  See Mary Young, The Exercise of Sovereignty in Cherokee Georgia, 10 J. 
EARLY REPUBLIC 43, 44 (1990).  Regardless, none of these reasons comes close to justifying the 
State of Georgia’s attempt to use legislation to define an entire nation of people as criminals. 
85. See LOTH, supra note 20, at 360; SMITH, supra note 82, at 516; STITES, supra note 21, at 
161; Burke, supra note 74, at 512. 
86. SMITH, supra note 82, at 516; see also Burke, supra note 74, at 512-13. 
The state court decision, allegedly written by William H. Crawford completely vindi-
cated Georgia’s sovereign right to govern the Indians and denounced Northern fanatics 
for making the Cherokee question a party issue.  The Governor and state legislature 
publicly vowed never to let the Tassel case, or any other case, be carried to the 
Supreme Court.  The execution of George Tassel in the face of a writ of error issued 
by Chief Justice John Marshall showed that Georgia meant business.  The Jacksonian 
press warned the Supreme Court not to interfere, and Congress echoed the warning by 
debating late in January 1831 a resolution calling for the repeal of section 25 of the 
Judiciary Act of 1789, which permitted the review of state court decisions by writ of 
error. 
Burke, supra note 74, at 512-13. 
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didn’t realize it at the time.  In the end, in part as a result of the Cherokee 
cases, President Jackson became that which he despised—a national 
authority-protecting, old time Federalist.  As the Chief Justice wrote with 
smug relief: 
Imitating the Quaker who said the dog he wished to destroy was 
mad, they said Andrew Jackson had become a Federalist, even an 
ultra-Federalist.  To have said he was ready to break down and 
trample on every other department of the government would not 
have injured him, but to say that he was a Federalist—a convert to 
the opinions of Washington, was a mortal blow under which he is 
yet staggering.87 
President Jackson, as a direct result of Georgia’s intransigence inspiring the 
other southern states to attempt to nullify federal law, had no choice but to 
seek federal legislation allowing the Executive to use the military to enforce 
federal law, including Supreme Court mandates.88  The president then 
solved the problem of Georgia’s refusal to comply with Worcester by 
“pressuring Governor Wilson Lumpkin to release Worcester and Butler, 
which he did on the very day the Court reconvened.  No mandate was 
therefore required from the Court, and the Georgia crisis eased.”89  And 
Chief Justice Marshall, in part because of the Trilogy, preserved enough of 
his federalism jurisprudence to preserve federal authority.90  Some 
 
87. See LOTH, supra note 20, at 368 (quoting a letter from Chief Justice Marshall to Justice 
Story). 
88. See SMITH, supra note 82, at 519 (“When South Carolina passed an ordinance of 
nullification declaring the federal tariff act unconstitutional and refusing compliance, Old Hickory 
reinforced the garrisons at Fort Moultrie and Sumpter, order the treasury department’s revenue 
cutters to enforce the tariff, and on December 10, 1832, issued his famous proclamation to the 
people of South Carolina calling the hand of the nullification forces.”); STITES, supra note 21, at 
165. 
In late November [1832] South Carolina passed a Nullification Ordinance invalidating 
the tariffs of 1828 and 1832, prohibiting any appeal to the Supreme Court, and threat-
ening succession if the national government intervened.  Jackson, however, would not 
tolerate defiance of a national law and said so unequivocally in a proclamation on 
December 10.  Then, in his message to Congress, he requested a force bill giving 
federal courts and the officials the power to deal with this emergency. 
STITES, supra note 21, at 165. 
89. ROBERTSON, supra note 4, at 136. 
90. See generally NEWMYER, supra note 80, at 88 (“Though the nationalist offensive of the 
Marshall Court was halted and much of its previous spirit and prestige had vanished, the pillars of 
Marshall’s constitutional law remained.”) (emphasis in original); ROBARGE, supra note 23, at 302 
(“[D]uring its last years the Marshall Court showed flexibility in interpreting the Constitution in 
ways that upheld the basic nationalist principles it had set forth before, while preserving its 
independence by preempting attacks from a populist administration and Congress that bore a 
residual antijudiciary sentiment from earlier years.”) . 
       
2006] THE IRON COLD 645 
commentators find it ironic91 that Chief Justice Marshall’s final 
constitutional opinion was Barron v. Baltimore, a decision holding that the 
Bill of Rights does not apply to the states.92  But consider that Barron is 
also the decision upon which the Court later relied to hold that the Bill of 
Rights does not apply to Indian tribes.93 
But in the 1832 Term, the Marshall Court voted 5-1 to declare 
unconstitutional the laws of Georgia purporting to invalidate the entire 
Cherokee Nation in Worcester v. Georgia.94  Though Chief Justice 
Marshall’s wife Polly had passed during the previous recess and his health 
wavered, he delivered an opinion one commentator declared as “one of the 
most powerful he ever delivered.”95  Justice Story wrote to his wife, 
“Thanks be to God, . . . the Court can wash their hands clean of the iniquity 
of oppressing the Indians and disregarding their rights.”96  Justice M’Lean 
offered a concurring opinion and concurred in the chief justice’s opinion as 
well.97  Justice Baldwin dissented but offered no opinion except to reiterate 
what he stated in Cherokee Nation.98 
The core of the majority opinion relied upon the enactment of the First 
Congress of the trade and intercourse acts99: 
 
91. E.g., STITES, supra note 21, at 165 (“Since the early 1820s the chief justice had 
compromised to preserve the Union and the Court.  A final concession came during the 1833 term 
in Barron v. Baltimore, his last constitutional opinion.”). 
92. 32 U.S. 243, 250-51 (1833). 
93. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 382 (1896) (citation omitted). 
94. 31 U.S. 515, 596 (1832). 
95. SMITH, supra note 82, at 518 (“Marshall was seventy-six years old.  He had just 
recovered from a severe operation and had recently experienced the death of his wife.  Yet his 
twenty-eight-page decision in Worcester v. Georgia is one of the most powerful he ever 
delivered.”). 
96. STITES, supra note 21, at 164. 
97. See Cherokee Nation, 31 U.S. at 562 (McLean, J., concurring). 
98. See id. at 561. 
99. See AMAR, supra note 55, at 108 n.* (“It also bears notice that the First Congress enacted 
a statue regulating noneconomic interactions and altercations—‘intercourse’—with Indians; see 
An Act to regulate trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes, July 22, 1790, 1 Stat. 137. Section 
5 of this act dealt with crimes—whether economic or not—committed by Americans on Indian 
lands.”); Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Constitution and the Yale School of Constitutional 
Interpretation, 115 YALE L.J. 1997, 2004 n.25 (2006). 
It also bears note that none of the leading clausebound advocates of a narrow 
economic reading of ‘commerce’ has come to grips with the basic inadequacy of their 
reading as applied to Indian tribes, or has squarely confronted the originalist 
implications of the Indian Intercourse Act of 1790, in which the First Congress plainly 
regulated noneconomic intercourse with Indian tribes. 
Amar, supra, at 2004 n.25 (citation omitted); see Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American 
Administrative Law: Federalist Foundations, 1787-1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256, 1300 (2006).  
Congress’s satisfaction with presidential administration with respect to Indian tribes 
may simply have mirrored its judgment concerning executive authority with respect to 
the War and State Departments.  From the political perspective of the late eighteenth 
century, commerce with the Indian tribes may have seemed less like regulating 
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From the commencement of our government, congress has passed 
acts to regulate trade and intercourse with the Indians; which treat 
them as nations, respect their rights, and manifest a firm purpose 
to afford that protection which treaties stipulate.  All these acts, 
and especially that of 1802, which is still in force, manifestly 
consider the several Indian nations as distinct political commu-
nities, having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is 
exclusive, and having a right to all the lands within those 
boundaries, which is not only acknowledged, but guarantied by the 
United States.100 
The opinion reiterates what the Cherokee Nation Court held, that Indian 
tribes were distinct national entities, with some very powerful language: 
The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, inde-
pendent political communities, retaining their original natural 
rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time im-
memorial; with the single exception of that imposed by irresistible 
power, which excluded them from intercourse with any other 
European potentate than the first discoverer of the coast of the 
particular region claimed: and this was a restriction which those 
European potentates imposed on themselves, as well as on the 
Indians.  The very term “nation,” so generally applied to them, 
means “a people distinct from others.”101 
In a final iteration of the Court’s challenge to the State of Georgia and all 
the Southern states threatening nullification of federal law, Chief Justice 
 
interstate commerce than like some combination of the exercise of the war and foreign 
affairs powers.  Essentially standardless regulatory authority may have been given to 
the President because Congress understood Indian affairs to be an executive—meaning 
political—function, but was not sure which executive department should take on the 
task. 
 Mashaw, supra, at 1300; see Angela R. Riley, Recovering Collectivity: Group Rights to 
Intellectual Property in Indigenous Communities, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 175, 205 (2000) 
[hereinafter Riley, Recovering Collectively].  
The United States Constitution, this country’s primary political treatise, acknowledges 
Indian Nations’ unique status through the “Indian Commerce Clause.”  The Indian 
Commerce Clause extends a grant of singular authority to Congress to regulate 
intercourse and trade with Indian tribes, the only minority group explicitly mentioned 
in the Constitution.  Just as the Foreign Nations Clause provides for federal control of 
commercial relations with foreign nations, the Indian Commerce Clause in effect 
recognizes the tribes’ unique position as quasi-sovereign nations-within-a-nation, and 
shields them from state and local interference. 
Riley, Recovering Collectively, supra, at 205 (footnotes omitted). 
100. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 556-57 (1832). 
101. Id. at 559. 
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Marshall threw down the gauntlet by making absolutely clear that state law 
does not apply in Indian Country: 
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its 
own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the 
laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of 
Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the 
Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the 
acts of congress.  The whole intercourse between the United States 
and this nation, is by our constitution and laws, vested in the 
government of the United States.102 
There had not been a stronger statement of respect for the legal authority of 
Indian tribes—and there has not yet been one like it since. 
C. THE CURRENT (IN)SIGNIFICANCE OF THE HOLDINGS 
The Marshall Trilogy has fallen on hard times.  The holdings are either 
irrelevant to Indian tribes (except for the bad-news-for-Indians portions of 
the opinions) or ignored by the modern Supreme Court.  For example, tribes 
still cannot sue states without their consent.103  Tribes don’t even have the 
right to sue under the federal civil rights statutes.104  And history was not 
kind to the victors of the Worcester decision.  Within the decade, the 
Cherokee Nation endured the Trail of Tears despite the fact that they won 
the legal war.105  The executive’s rejection of the Worcester principle 
haunts Indian tribes today106—Worcester’s rejection of the Johnson rule 
that preemption granted title to the discovering nation was itself rejected in 
the 1835 Term in Mitchel v. United States.107  As a result, the legal lineage 
of state assertion of jurisdiction over Indian Country continues to be the 
obiter dicta of Johnson and not the holding of Worcester. 
Moreover, the Marshall Trilogy no longer drives the constitutional 
common law of the Supreme Court since the advent of Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s tenure when it hears a case regarding Indian tribes and Indian 
people.  On occasion, the Court relies upon Worcester for the proposition 
that the authority to deal with Indian nations is an exclusive federal 
 
102. Id. at 561. 
103. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Blatchford v. Native Vill. of 
Noatak and Circle Vill., 501 U.S. 775 (1991). 
104. See Inyo County v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians of the Bishop Cmty. of Bishop Colony, 
538 U.S. 701 (2003). 
105. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, supra note 9, at § 1.03[4]; 
BOBBITT, supra note 73, at 114. 
106. See ROBERTSON, supra note 4, at 135. 
107. 34 U.S. 711, 746 (1835); ROBERTSON, supra note 4, at 138-39. 
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authority108 or for a general affirmation that the Court acknowledges tribal 
sovereignty.109  But the Court is more likely to remind tribal advocates that 
Worcester acknowledged certain limitations on Indian tribes,110 or that the 
decision is old news, as Justice Scalia wrote in Nevada v. Hicks: “Though 
tribes are often referred to as ‘sovereign’ entities, it was ‘long ago’ that ‘the 
Court departed from Chief Justice Marshall’s view that ‘the laws of [a 
State] can have no force’ within reservation boundaries.”111  In general, 
when an Indian tribe argues that Worcester compels a certain result in their 
favor, the Court rebuffs them.112  Now, when Worcester is cited, it is 
usually in dissent.113  Even the federalism repercussions of the Worcester 
opinion are cited in forgotten or disregarded federalism cases.114 
So, why study the Trilogy? 
II. THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE MODERN DEBATES 
Careful readings of the Marshall Trilogy—and even not-so-careful 
readings—reveal that the issues confronted by the Marshall Court often are 
the same confronting modern tribal advocates.  The origins of the trust 
relationship and plenary power are born out of the argumentation between 
members of the Marshall Court over the meaning of the word “protection” 
in Indian treaties.  The discussion of the meaning of the word “protection” 
 
108. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 202 (2004) (quoting Worcester, 31 U.S. at 
557). 
109. See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Sac and Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 123 (1993) (quoting 
Worcester, 31 U.S. at 557). 
110. E.g., Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 
408, 426 (1989). 
111. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 361 (2001) (quoting White Mountain Apache Tribe v. 
Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 141 (1980), and Worcester, 31 U.S. at 561); see also Kiowa Tribe of Okla. 
v. Mfg. Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 762 n.2 (1998) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The general notion 
drawn from Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Worchester . . ., that an Indian reservation is a 
distinct nation within whose boundaries state law cannot penetrate, has yielded to closer analysis 
when confronted, in the course of subsequent developments, with diverse concrete situations.”) 
(quoting Organized Vill. of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 72 (1962)) (other citations omitted); 
County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 
256 (1992) (quoting Worcester 31 U.S. at 556-57, but then asserting, “The platonic notions of 
Indian sovereignty that guided Chief Justice Marshall have, over time, lost their independent 
sway.”) (quotation marks and citations omitted); Brendale, 492 U.S. at 451 nn.1-2 (Blackmun,  J., 
concurring and dissenting); South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc., 476 U.S. 498, 527 
(1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
112. E.g., Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520, 530 n.5 (1998). 
113. E.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 149 n.40 (1996) (Souter, J., 
dissenting); Hagen v. Utah, 510 U.S. 399, 423 n.2 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Blatchford v. 
Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 791, 792, 795 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Duro v. 
Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 705 n.3 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
114. E.g., Howlett ex. rel. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 368 n.15 (1990) (quoting 
Worcester, 31 U.S. at 571 (McLean, J., concurring)); Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 
U.S. 234, 296 n.51 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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led to the creation of the canon of construing Indian treaty language.  Tribal 
immunity from state jurisdiction and authority derived from the underlying 
states’ rights questions resolved by the Marshall Court in the Trilogy, in 
part, by designating Indian tribes as having a political status unlike states or 
foreign nations.  Along the way, the Trilogy undertook the first and second 
instances of implicit divestiture of tribal authority.  And the Trilogy did 
more than that.  This Part details the origins of these oh-so-modern 
doctrines in the Trilogy. 
A. PLENARY POWER & TRUST DOCTRINE, OR “PROTECTION” VS. 
“DEPENDENCE” 
The most interesting analysis in the Marshall Trilogy—and which may 
have a great deal of import in modern American Indian law—involved the 
question of whether Indian tribes are dependent (assimilated) or distinct 
(independent).  Both the doctrines of federal plenary power over Indian 
tribes (or Indian affairs) and the trust relationship are related to this 
discussion. 
1. Protection or Dependence? 
The important overlay of this debate involves the boilerplate treaty 
language of “protection.”115  The various Justices debated the meaning of 
“protection” as being either an invitation to dependence or a recognition of 
political distinctiveness. 
Justice Baldwin’s Cherokee Nation concurrence was the first to focus 
on the word “protection” in the Northwest Ordinance116 and the Treaty of 
Hopewell.117  The Treaty of Hopewell explained the purpose of the treaty 
 
115. Besides the Cherokee treaties, other Indian treaties the Marshall Court discussed, 
including the Delaware treaty, used the term “protection” as well.  See Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 65 (1831) (Thompson, J., dissenting); see also Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 
515, 551 (1832) (noting that “[t]his stipulation is found in Indian treaties, generally”). 
116. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 35 (Baldwin, J., concurring). 
In this spirit congress passed the celebrated ordinance of July 1787, by which they 
assumed the government of the north western territory, paying no regard to Indian 
jurisdiction, sovereignty, or their political rights, except providing for their protection; 
authorizing the adoption of laws “which, for the prevention of crimes and injuries, 
shall have force in all parts of the district; and for the execution of process civil and 
criminal, the governor has power to make proper division thereof.” 1 Laws United 
States, 477. 
Id. (Baldwin, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
117. See id. at 38 (Baldwin, J., concurring) . 
The word nation is not used in the preamble or any part of the treaty, so that we are 
left to infer the capacity in which the Cherokees contracted, whether as an independent 
nation or foreign state or a tribe of Indians, from the terms of the treaty, its stipulations 
and conditions. “The Indians for themselves and their respective tribes and towns do 
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and, by extension, the meaning of “protection”: “For the benefit and com-
fort of the Indians, and for the prevention of injuries and aggressions on the 
part of the citizens or Indians . . . .”118  Despite this explicit language that 
tends to lead one (perhaps) in the other direction, Justice Baldwin took the 
meaning of this language to be that Indian tribes had a “dependent 
character;”119 that “protection” was “indenture of servitude;”120 and that the 
Cherokee Nation, as a result of the treaty, was “dependent on and appendant 
to the state government.”121  He concluded that the “protection” language 
and the context of the Treaty of Hopewell granted Congress the right to 
decide the “internal affairs” should it wished to at a later date,122 a precursor 
to the plenary power Congress would later take up in force.123 
According to Chief Justice Marshall in the Johnson case, Indian tribes 
included characteristics of both “dependent” or “distinct” nations,124 a sort 
of middle ground.  But in Cherokee Nation, writing for “the Court” (but 
really only for himself and one other Justice),125 he famously labeled Indian 
tribes “domestic dependent nations”126 as a new legal term of art created 
 
acknowledge all the Cherokees to be under the protection of the United States.” 
Article 3d. 1 Laws U. S. 322.  
Id. (first emphasis in original; second emphasis added). 
118. Id. at 38 (Baldwin, J., concurring) (quoting Treaty of Hopewell, art. IX) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
119. Id. (Baldwin, J., concurring); see also id. at 40 (Baldwin, J., concurring) (“dependants”). 
120. Id. at 39 (Baldwin, J., concurring). 
121. Id. at 40. 
122. Id.  
That by the existing regulations and treaties, the Indian tenure to their lands was their 
allotment as hunting grounds without the power of alienation, that the right of 
occupancy was not individual, that the Indians were forbidden all trade or intercourse 
with any person not licensed or at a post not designated by regulation, that Indian 
affairs formed no part of the foreign concerns of the government, and that though they 
were permitted to regulate their internal affairs in their own way, it was not by any 
inherent right acknowledged by congress or reserved by treaty, but because congress 
did not think proper to exercise the sole and exclusive right, declared and asserted in 
all their regulations from 1775 to 1788, in the articles of confederation, in the ordi-
nance of 1787 and the proclamation of 1788; which the plaintiffs solemnly recognized 
and expressly granted by the treaty of Hopewell in 1785, as conferred on congress to 
be exercised as they should think proper. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
123. See Saikrishna Prakash, Against Tribal Fungibility, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1069, 1078-79 
(2004) (discussing the approval of federal statutes extending federal criminal jurisdiction into 
Indian Country in United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886)); Robert N. Clinton, There is No 
Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113, 180-81 (2002) (same). 
124. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 596 (1823) (“The peculiar situation of the Indians, 
necessarily considered, in some respects, as a dependent, and in some respects as a distinct people, 
occupying a country claimed by Great Britain, and yet too powerful and brave not to be dreaded 
as formidable enemies. . . .”). 
125. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 15 (Marshall, C.J.). 
126. Id. at 17. 
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from whole cloth in order to avoid classifying Indian tribes as either states 
or foreign nations.  In this case, the Chief Justice denigrates Indian tribes a 
great deal: “[T]hey are in a state of pupilage.  Their relation to the United 
States resembles that of a ward to his guardian.”127  In this opinion, Indian 
tribes appear to be dependent in large extent to the United States.128  Justice 
Johnson, in his Cherokee Nation concurring opinion, avoided the guardian-
ward dichotomy and used the term “master and conqueror” in reference to 
the United States.129  In Justice Johnson’s view, Indian tribes existed in a 
state of “feudal dependence” to the United States130—in other words, 
complete and utter dependence on the order of slaves or serfs. 
Justice Thompson’s dissent (joined by Justice Story) in Cherokee 
Nation suggested a different reading of the word “protection.”  Drawing on 
the venerable Vattel, Justice Thompson found that weaker states signing 
treaties of protection do not, as a side-effect, lose their sovereignty.131  All 
that is required for a weaker state to retain statehood is a reservation of the 
right to self-government, a staple in American Indian treaties.132  
 
127. Id.  
128. Id. at 17-18. 
They look to our government for protection; rely upon its kindness and its power; 
appeal to it for relief to their wants; and address the president as their great father.  
They and their country are considered by foreign nations, as well as by ourselves, as 
being so completely under the sovereignty and dominion of the United States, that any 
attempt to acquire their lands, or to form a political connexion with them, would be 
considered by all as an invasion of our territory, and an act of hostility. 
Id.  
129. See id. at 27 (Johnson, J., concurring). 
130. See id. at 24 (“[N]ot to be able to alienate without permission of the remainder-man or 
lord, places [Indian tribes] in a state of feudal dependence.”). 
131. See id. at 53 (Thompson, J., dissenting). 
Every nation that governs itself, under what form soever, without any dependence on a 
foreign power, is a sovereign state.  Its rights are naturally the same as those of any 
other state.  Such are moral persons who live together in a natural society, under the 
law of nations.  It is sufficient if it be really sovereign and independent: that is, it must 
govern itself by its own authority and laws.  We ought, therefore, to reckon in the 
number of sovereigns those states that have bound themselves to another more power-
ful, although by an unequal alliance.  The conditions of these unequal alliances may be 
infinitely varied; but whatever they are, provided the inferior ally reserves to itself the 
sovereignty or the right to govern its own body, it ought to be considered an 
independent state.  Consequently, a weak state, that, in order to provide for its safety, 
places itself under the protection of a more powerful one, without stripping itself of the 
right of government and sovereignty, does not cease on this account to be placed 
among the sovereigns who acknowledge no other power.  Tributary and feudatory 
states do not thereby cease to be sovereign and independent states, so long as self 
government, and sovereign and independent authority is left in the administration of 
the state.  
Id. (citing EMANUEL VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 16, 17 (1758)) (emphasis added). 
132. See id. at 54-55 (Thompson, J., dissenting). 
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“Protection” and nationhood are not mutually exclusive.133  Presaging 
modern Indian affairs where all Indian tribes (save one) are located within 
the boundaries of a state, Justice Thompson argued that “[t]he Cherokee 
territory being within the chartered limits of Georgia, does not affect the 
question.”134  Moreover, state courts had defined “protection” to be consis-
tent with the retention of sovereignty.135  Justice Thompson would have 
found that the Cherokee Nation was a “foreign nation” in the meaning of 
the Constitution.136  Justice Thompson’s version of “protection” did not 
mean all-encompassing dependency, but instead, significant political 
independence. 
While Justice Thompson’s definition of “protection” did not win the 
day in Cherokee Nation, the Court in Worcester, per Chief Justice Marshall, 
adopted this meaning.  Writing for the Court (with Justice Baldwin the lone 
dissenter), Chief Justice Marshall drew upon the pre-Revolutionary War 
relations between Great Britain and the Indian tribes to find that “protec-
tion” meant what the Indians would have thought it meant—“It merely 
bound the nation to the British crown, as a dependent ally, claiming the 
protection of a powerful friend and neighbour, and receiving the advantages 
 
They have never been, by conquest, reduced to the situation of subjects to any 
conqueror, and thereby lost their separate national existence, and the rights of self 
government, and become subject to the laws of the conqueror.  When ever wars have 
taken place, they have been followed by regular treaties of peace, containing 
stipulations on each side according to existing circumstances; the Indian nation always 
preserving its distinct and separate national character. 
Id. 
133. See id. at 55. 
[T]he right of occupancy is still admitted to remain in them, accompanied with the 
right of self government, according to their own usages and customs; and with the 
competency to act in a national capacity, although placed under the protection of the 
whites, and owing a qualified subjection so far as is requisite for public safety.  But 
the principle is universally admitted, that this occupancy belongs to them as matter of 
right, and not by mere indulgence.  They cannot be disturbed in the enjoyment of it, or 
deprived of it, without their free consent; or unless a just and necessary war should 
sanction their dispossession. 
Id. 
134. Id. Justice Story’s Commentaries makes the same argument: “The power, then, given to 
congress to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes, extends equally to tribes living within or 
without the boundaries of particular states, and within or without the territorial limits of the United 
States.” 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 1095, at 542 (1833). 
135. See id. at 67-68 (discussing Jackson v. Goodel, 20 Johns. 193 (N.Y. 1822)). 
136. See id. at 55. 
The progress made in civilization by the Cherokee Indians cannot surely be considered 
as in any measure destroying their national or foreign character, so long as they are 
permitted to maintain a separate and distinct government; it is their political condition 
that constitutes their foreign character, and in that sense must the term foreign, be 
understood as used in the constitution. 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
       
2006] THE IRON COLD 653 
of that protection, without involving a surrender of their national char-
acter.”137  So it was with the British crown as it is with the American 
government, Chief Justice Marshall added.138  In what appears to be a 
reversal (or at least a substantial modification) of his earlier position that 
Indian tribes were “domestic dependent nations”139 (a position that, one 
might remember, perhaps garnered only two votes in Cherokee Nation), 
Chief Justice Marshall’s Worcester opinion labels Indian tribes “distinct, 
independent political communities.”140  Dependency is not present in this 
holding.  As a final point, Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion concludes by 
adopting Justice Thompson’s analysis of Vattel, that a “weaker power” does 
not surrender the right to self-government by agreeing to the protection of 
the more powerful nation.141  Chief Justice Marshall ends with his famous 
 
137. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 552 (1832). 
What was of still more importance, the strong hand of government was interposed to 
restrain the disorderly and licentious from intrusions into their country, from 
encroachments on their lands, and from those acts of violence which were often 
attended by reciprocal murder.  The Indians perceived in this protection, only what 
was beneficial to themselves-an engagement to punish aggressions on them.  It 
involved practically no claim to their lands, no dominion over their persons.  It merely 
bound the nation to the British crown, as a dependent ally, claiming the protection of 
a powerful friend and neighbour, and receiving the advantages of that protection, 
without involving a surrender of their national character. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
138. See id. at 551 (“The same stipulation entered into with the United States, is undoubtedly 
to be construed in the same manner.  They receive the Cherokee nation into their favour and 
protection.  The Cherokees acknowledge themselves to be under the protection of the United 
States, and of no other power.  Protection does not imply the destruction of the protected.”). 
139. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17 (Marshall, C.J.). 
140. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 559. 
The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent political 
communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the 
soil, from time immemorial, with the single exception of that imposed by irresistible 
power, which excluded them from intercourse with any other European potentate than 
the first discoverer of the coast of the particular region claimed: and this was a 
restriction which those European potentates imposed on themselves, as well as on the 
Indians.  The very term “nation,” so generally applied to them, means “a people 
distinct from others.” 
Id. 
141. Id. at 560-61. 
The very fact of repeated treaties with them recognizes it; and the settled doctrine of 
the law of nations is, that a weaker power does not surrender its independence—its 
right to self-government, by associating with a stronger, and taking its protection.  A 
weak state, in order to provide for its safety, may place itself under the protection of 
one more powerful, without stripping itself of the right of government, and ceasing to 
be a state.  Examples of this kind are not wanting in Europe.  “Tributary and feudatory 
states,” says Vattel, “do not thereby cease to be sovereign and independent states, so 
long as self-government and sovereign and independent authority, are left in the 
administration of the state.”  At the present day, more than one state may be con-
sidered as holding its right of self-government under the guarantee and protection of 
one or more allies. 
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dictum, “The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its 
own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of 
Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right 
to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokee themselves, or in conformity 
with treaties, and with the acts of congress.”142 
Despite the fact that Worcester rejected the “dependency” theory in 
favor of the “distinct and independent” theory, the Court later relied more 
on the false dependency created by the Cherokee Nation opinion to create 
both plenary power and the trust relationship. 
2. Plenary Power 
Professor Charles Burdick noted in his early-twentieth century treatise 
on constitutional law that the origins of federal authority over Indian affairs 
remained an open question since there was no clear textual provisions in the 
Constitution that provided for such authority: “These [constitutional pro-
visions] leave untouched the general field of constitutional power to deal 
with Indian affairs, and it has been necessary for the Supreme Court to 
build up here a very considerable body of unwritten constitutional law.”143  
While there is, according to Professor Burdick, a “general field of constitu-
tional power to deal with Indian affairs,” the source of that authority 
remains uncertain.  This is a particular problem for many commentators144 
and a few Justices.145  Congress claims plenary power over Indian affairs in 
two ways: first, Congress claims exclusive authority to deal with Indian 
 
Id. 
142. Id. at 561. 
143. CHARLES K. BURDICK, THE LAW OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGIN AND 
DEVELOPMENT § 107, at 313 (1922) (citing the Indian Commerce Clause and the Indians Not 
Taxed Clauses).  By “unwritten constitutional law,” it appears that Burdick means a common law 
generated out of the interpretation of the Constitution as it pertains to Indian affairs. 
144. E.g., Ball, supra note 11, at 59 (“Indian nations have prevented recent congressional 
deployment of plenary power against them. But the plenary power does not lie idle.  Like Ariel, it 
reappears, transported from Congress to the Supreme Court, where its lack of both limits and 
legitimacy is matched by a lack of appeal from its results.”); Cleveland, supra note 11, at 26 (“The 
first difficulty posed by the Indian cases was textual: the Constitution does not bestow any general 
power on the national government to regulate Indian affairs.”); Robert N. Clinton, Redressing the 
Legacy of Conquest: A Vision Quest for a Decolonized Federal Indian Law, 46 ARK. L. REV. 77, 
112 (1993) [hereinafter Clinton, Redressing] (discussing “the myth of plenary federal power in 
Indian affairs, a doctrine that had little textual support in the provisions of the Constitution and 
even less in the contemporaneous history surrounding the adoption of that document”). 
145. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 224 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The 
Court utterly fails to find any provision of the Constitution that gives Congress enumerated power 
to alter tribal sovereignty.”). 
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affairs;146 and second, Congress claims authority to legislate over the 
internal affairs and sovereignty of Indian tribes.147 
During the history of federal Indian law, the Supreme Court (and 
Congress) has relied upon the Indian Commerce Clause148 and the Treaty 
Clause149 to uphold these assertions of authority by Congress,150 but neither 
of these provisions can satisfy everyone given the extraordinary breadth and 
depth of the authority claimed by Congress.  The Indian Commerce Clause 
is limited to commerce (whatever that means)151 and, given the Rehnquist 
Court’s limited view of what “commerce” entails,152 the Court strains to 
conclude that the power to deal with Indian affairs is sufficient to, say, 
enact criminal laws for Indian Country.153  The Treaty Clause is an Article 
II provision and does not confer authority onto Congress except 
(arguably)154 where an executive branch-negotiated treaty ratified by the 
Senate extends Congressional authority into areas where it might not be 
otherwise.155  But this works only insofar as the treaty says so156—the 
Michigan Ottawas could not enter into a treaty with the United States that 
 
146. E.g., Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2701 (2000). 
147. E.g., Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (2000). 
148. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3. 
149. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 2. 
150. Professor Sarah Cleveland asserts that the federal government’s plenary power over 
Indian affairs derives from the Doctrine of Discovery. See Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International 
Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 43 (2006) (citing United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 
380-82 (1886)). 
151. But see AMAR, supra note 55, at 108, n.*. 
152. See generally MARK TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED: THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE 
FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 255-78 (2005). 
153. E.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 378-79 (1886). 
The mention of Indians in the Constitution which has received most attention is that 
found in the clause which gives Congress ‘power to regulate commerce with foreign 
nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.’  This clause is relied 
on in the argument in the present case, the proposition being that the statute under 
consideration is a regulation of commerce with the Indian tribes.  But we think it 
would be a very strained construction of this clause, that a system of criminal laws for 
Indians living peaceably in their reservations, which left out the entire code of trade 
and intercourse laws justly enacted under that provision, and established punishments 
for the common-law crimes of murder, manslaughter, arson, burglary, larceny, and the 
like, without any reference to their relation to any kind of commerce, was authorized 
by the grant of power to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes. 
Id. 
154. But see Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
1867 (2005). 
155. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
156. See Robert N. Clinton, Reservation Specificity and Indian Adjudication: An Essay on 
the Importance of Limited Contextualism in Indian Law, 8 HAMLINE L. REV. 543 (1985); see 
generally Prakash, supra note 123. 
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would extend Congressional authority to deal with the affairs of the 
Cherokee Nation. 
The Court’s most recent articulation of the solution to finding the 
source of authority for Congress to legislate in affairs of all the tribes is that 
the authority may be “preconstitutional.”157  Justice Breyer’s majority 
opinion in United States v. Lara identified two areas where the federal 
government’s authority might extend beyond the strictures of the 
Constitution to powers that are “necessary concomitants of nationality”:158 
Congressional authority in dealing with Indian affairs159 and executive 
authority to prosecute war profiteers.160  The earlier power has come under 
compelling attacks by commentators.161 
The interesting thing about Justice Breyer’s theory of “preconsti-
tutional” authority to deal with Indian affairs is that the issue comes up 
during his discussion of the Treaty Clause as a source of authority.162  There 
appears to be a conscious (or unconscious) merging of these two theories—
theories that could be categorized as separate.  Either Congress relies upon 
 
157. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 201 (2004). 
158. Lara, 541 U.S. at 201 (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Co., 299 U.S. 
304, 318 (1936)). 
159. See Lara, 541 U.S. at 201-02 (citing 2 J. CONTINENTAL CONG. 174-75 (1775) (W. Ford 
ed. 1905); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 557 (1832)).  But see generally Kirsten Matoy 
Carlson, Is Hindsight 20-20? Reconsidering the Importance of Pre-Constitutional Documents, 30 
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 4 (2005-2006). 
The existence of so many constitutions developing out of written pre-constitutional 
norms, and the renewed interest in the serious study of constitutional politics, makes 
this an opportune moment to address the question of the place that pre-constitutional 
documents should have in modern constitutional orders.  Should pre-constitutional 
documents be largely forgotten and discarded, or do they retain some inherent value 
that suggests that they deserve the attention that at least some of them have received 
publicly?  Is it enough to acknowledge that these documents exist and use them 
rhetorically?  Do they provide key insights into constitutional law and politics that 
mandate more critical retrospective analysis?  What status should we accord these 
texts today? 
Id. 
160. See Lara, 541 U.S. at 201 (citing Curtiss-Wright Export Co., 299 U.S. at 315-22). 
161. E.g., HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING 
POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 94 (1990). 
Among government attorneys, Justice Sutherland’s lavish description of the 
president’s powers [in Curtiss-Wright Export Co.] is so often cited that it has come to 
be known as the “Curtiss-Wright-so-I’m-right” cite—a statement of deference to the 
president so sweeping as to be worthy of frequent citation in any government foreign-
affairs brief. 
Id.; see ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 127 (Sanford Levinson ed., 
Univ. of Chi. Press 1994) (1960) (“The danger is of course that the other branches of government 
will fail to assume the constitutional responsibility which the Court has tendered to them, and will 
interpret the assignment as a license to act arbitrarily.”); Charles A. Lofgren, United States v. 
Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An Historical Reassessment, 83 YALE L.J. 1 (1973). 
162. Lara, 541 U.S. at 201. 
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the treaties negotiated and ratified in accordance with the Treaty Clause or 
it relies on a “preconstitutional” authority.  This merging of the two theories 
is interesting because the members of the Marshall Court attempted a 
similar thing in the Trilogy and the Taney Court succeeded in doing so in 
United States v. Kagama.163 
This is what happened: First, the Marshall Court in Cherokee Nation 
fudged the meaning of the word “protection” in the Cherokee treaties to 
mean that they were dependent on the United States for more than military 
reasons and implied that they were incompetent.  What those additional 
reasons for dependency were the Marshall Court did not articulate.  By the 
time the Taney Court decided Kagama, there were new reasons in some 
parts of Indian Country—food and shelter,164 protection from state 
militias,165 and the standard military preservation of Indian reservation 
borders that was intended by the treaties.  Some, but not all, Indian tribes 
really were dependent on the federal government,166 so the Taney Court 
filled in the blanks left by the Marshall Court and created the doctrine of 
 
163. 118 U.S. 375 (1886); see also Michael C. Bluum, Retracing the Discovery Doctrine: 
Aboriginal Title, Tribal Sovereignty, and Their Significance to Treaty-Making and Modern 
Natural Resources Policy in Indian Country, 28 VT. L. REV. 713, 759 (2004) (“Over the years, 
subsequent courts and Congresses misinterpreted the Marshall Court’s language and undermined 
the principles it laid down.  In particular, the guardian/ward language in the Cherokee Nation case 
was transformed from a concept protective of tribal prerogatives into one that gave Congress 
virtually unbridled power over Indian affairs.”); Clinton, Redressing, supra note 144, at 112 
(citing United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886); quoting Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 
593 (1832) (M’Lean, J., concurring)). 
164. E.g., John P. LaVelle, Rescuing Paha Sapa: Achieving Environmental Justice by 
Restoring the Great Grasslands and Returning the Sacred Black Hills to the Great Sioux Nation, 5 
GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 40, 50-52 (2001). 
As with its military strategy, the defining element of the United States’ political strat-
egy for dispossessing Paha Sapa was coercion.  The Fort Laramie Treaty guaranteed 
subsistence rations to the Sioux until 1872, as well as the right to hunt outside the 
reservation’s boundaries.  However, soon after the treaty was signed, the United States 
restricted and then eliminated the Sioux tribes’ off-reservation hunting rights in 
response to “the inevitable clashes between off-reservation hunting parties and 
whites.”  Thus, after the expiration of the treaty subsistence rations in 1872, and be-
cause of the government’s failure to assimilate the Lakota, Dakota, and Nakota people 
to yeoman farming culture, the Sioux tribes remained dependent on government 
rations to avoid mass starvation. 
Id. (footnotes omitted).  But see, e.g., BANNER, supra note 32, at 3-4 (“Any given decision 
on the part of Indians to sell land, like any decision made by anyone about any subject, may 
be more or less voluntary, along a continuum that lacks any dividing line between 
categories.  There is a large middle ground between conquest and contract.”). 
165. See Rose Weston, Facing the Past, Facing the Future: Applying the Truth Commission 
Model to the Historic Treatment of Native Americans in the United States, 18 ARIZ. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 1017, 1042-43 (2001). 
166. See HELEN HUNT JACKSON, A CENTURY OF DISHONOR: THE EARLY CRUSADE FOR 
INDIAN REFORM 177 (Andrew F. Rolle ed., Harper Torch Books 1965) (1881) (describing the 
actions of the Indian Bureau forcing Sioux bands to move against their will by placing them in 
“almost a starving condition”). 
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plenary (absolute) power over Indians.  Second, the Marshall Court’s 
generalization of the meaning of the word “protection” allowed the Taney 
Court to place the weakest, most dependent Indian tribes in the same 
category as the most distinct, independent Indian tribes.  In sum, the law of 
plenary (absolute) power extended over all Indian tribes, not just the 
weakest and most dependent—a “least favored nations” clause incorporated 
by implication into every Indian treaty by the Supreme Court.167 
Justice Breyer’s endorsement, in terms careful to avoid the ethno-
centrism of Supreme Court opinions past, of a “preconstitutional” authority 
to deal with Indian affairs somehow derived from the Treaty Clause and the 
War Power is an endorsement of the “least favored nations” implied term.  
This is not to say that plenary power is wrong or unsupported.  Learned 
professors argue that the Indian Commerce Clause and the Treaty Clause 
can combine into a textual basis for plenary power.168  That monster of a 
debate is outside the scope of this essay, but this debate originates in the 
Marshall Trilogy.  As a matter of pedagogical value, then, the Trilogy, if 
read correctly, is an indispensable tool for understanding the origins of 
plenary power. 
3. Trust Relationship 
Seeds of what would become known as the “trust doctrine” found their 
way into the Trilogy.  In Johnson, Chief Justice Marshall wrote in dicta that 
Indians (i.e., the “conquered”) “shall not be wantonly oppressed.”169  The 
trust relationship exists because the Marshall Court opined that Indians 
were weak and dependent and needed the assistance of a higher power—the 
 
167. Justice Breyer also invoked the War Power. See Lara, 541 U.S. at 201 (citing COHEN’S 
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 208 (Rennard Strickland et al. eds., 1982). At a time when 
the Court’s recent decisions appear to cabin the President’s national security authority, e.g., 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006), this very broad reading of Congressional war power 
is interesting. 
168. E.g., Adrian Vermeule, Three Commerce Clauses? No Problem, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1175, 
1177 (2003).   
When the Court makes reference to the Indian commerce clause, then, we should in 
many cases take it as referring elliptically to the combined bases for federal plenary 
power over Indians. . . .  [T]aken together, the Indian commerce power and the Treaty 
Power authorize plenary federal control; the latter argument is the one that confounds 
Prakash’s positive claim about the scope of the Indian commerce clause. 
Id. (emphasis omitted). 
169. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 589 (1823). 
The title by conquest is acquired and maintained by force.  The conqueror prescribes 
its limits.  Humanity, however, acting on public opinion, has established, as a general 
rule, that the conquered shall not be wantonly oppressed, and that their condition shall 
remain as eligible as is compatible with the objects of the conquest. 
Id. 
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United States—to become civilized to the extent that they could save 
themselves from extinction.170  The Trilogy does not include a holding that 
the federal government should take action to assist Indians as moral 
imperative, but the origins of that view are there. 
There are two (mis)conceptions of the trust relationship.  Since the 
Marshall Court declared that Indians were weak and dependent (even if 
they could not make such a holding clear in the Cherokee cases), the Court 
asserted that the United States must treat them well.  The Court would help 
out the policymaking branches by holding them to a higher standard, what 
the Court referred to a hundred years later as a “fiduciary relationship.”171  
Nongovernmental entities such as the Friends of the Indian pushed this 
conception as well.172  As a result, at times, Congress even took action with 
the best interests of Indians and Indian tribes at heart.  Two notions of a 
trust relationship evolved from Supreme Court decisions and acts of 
Congress.  First, the federal government owes a duty—moral, ethical, or 
political—to Indians and Indian tribes in all of its actions.  This may be a 
guardian-ward relationship, a trustee-beneficiary relationship, or theoreti-
cally (according to Justice Johnson) a master-conqueror relationship.  
Second, certain statues create a trust duty toward Indians and Indian tribes 
similar to that of a common law trustee-beneficiary relationship. 
The modern view of the first type of trust relationship is that the duty 
owed by the federal government is too vague and amorphous to be enforce-
able.173  Some tribal advocates assume that since this first kind of trust 
relationship exists that Congress is precluded from enacting legislation that 
will harm tribal interests.  Nothing could be further from the truth. While 
Congress does tend to enact legislation purporting to benefit Indian tribes, 
Congress does enact laws that can be devastating to tribal interests.  The 
Major Crimes Act,174 the allotment acts,175 the Indian Civil Rights Act,176 
 
170. See Riley, Recovering Collectivity, supra note 99, at 206-10; Alex Tallchief Skibine, 
Gaming on Indian Reservations: Defining the Trustee’s Duty in the Wake of Seminole Tribe v. 
Florida, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 121, 156 (1997). 
171. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942). 
172. Stacy L. Leeds, By Eminent Domain or Some Other Name: A Tribal Perspective on 
Taking Land, 41 TULSA L. REV. 51, 65 (2005) [hereinafter Leeds, By Eminent Domain] (citing 
AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIANS: WRITINGS BY THE “FRIENDS OF THE INDIAN” 1880-
1900, 83-86 (Francis Paul Prucha ed., 1973)) (“The proponents of the allotment thought it was in 
the best interest of the tribes to abandon all forms of common ownership in favor of individual 
property rights.”). 
173. E.g., United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 (1980). 
174. Major Crimes Act, ch. 341, § 9, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (1885), as amended 18 U.S. § 1153 
(2000). See generally Kevin K. Washburn, Federal Criminal Law and Tribal Self-Determination, 
84 N.C. L. REV. 779 (2006); Kevin K. Washburn, American Indians, Crime, and the Law, 104 
MICH. L. REV. 709 (2006). 
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statutes that abrogate Indian treaties,177 and the removal acts178 are all fair 
game in the so-called trust relationship.  Nothing but the rational basis 
test—and that only in the last few decades179—stops Congress from playing 
dirty pool with Indian tribes. 
The modern view of the second type is that Congress must make 
extremely clear that a trust duty exists and that Congress expects and 
consents to be sued for money damages in the event the trust is breached.180  
Despite trust breaches that boggle the imagination, unless Congress says, 
“Go ahead and sue us for money,” the Court will not allow it.181 
The bigger picture of the trust relationship is that it conflicts with the 
policy of Congress and the executive toward Indians and Indian tribes of 
encouraging self-determination.  In other words, how can the federal gov-
ernment have a paternalistic trust relationship (or guardian-ward or master-
conqueror) when it supports tribal self-determination at the same time?  
How can Indian tribes demand benefits and entitlements from Congress and 
the executive when these same tribes demand the federal government to 
leave them alone?  One could argue that these two choices are in conflict.182 
But an examination of the Marshall Trilogy fleshes out the context of 
the trust relationship—self-determination dichotomy.  They are two sides of 
the same coin.  The Cherokee Nation, nestled in the northwest corner of 
 
175. See generally Kenneth H. Bobroff, Retelling Allotment: Indian Property Rights and the 
Myth of Common Ownership, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1559 (2001); Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of 
Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1 (1997). 
176. See generally Angela R. Riley, Sovereignty and Illiberalism, 95 CAL. L. REV. 
(forthcoming June 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
910611. 
177. See generally Robert Laurence, The Abrogation of Indian Treaties by Federal Statutes 
Protective of the Environment, 31 NAT. RESOURCES J. 859 (1991); David E. Wilkins, The 
Reinvigoration of the Doctrine of ‘Implied Repeals’: A Requiem for Indigenous Treaty Rights, 43 
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1 (1999). 
178. See generally Raymond Cross, Sovereign Bargains, Indian Takings, and the 
Preservation of Indian Country in the Twenty-First Century, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 425, 441-43 
(1998); Leeds, By Eminent Domain, supra note 172, 62-63; Richard White, How Andrew Jackson 
Saved the Cherokees, 5 GREEN BAG 2d 443 (2002) (reviewing ROBERT V. REMINI, ANDREW 
JACKSON AND HIS INDIAN WARS (2001)). 
179. See United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 413 (1980); Del. Tribal 
Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 84 (1977). 
180. Compare United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465 (2003), and 
United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983), with United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488 
(2003), and United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 (1982). 
181. See, e.g., Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Sawnawgezewog: The “Indian Problem” and the Lost 
Art of Survival, 28 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 35, 46-47 (2003-2004) (discussing Navajo Nation, 537 
U.S. 488). 
182. But see Rebecca Anita Tsosie, What Does It Mean to “Build a Nation”? Re-imagining 
Indigenous Political Identity in an Era of Self-Determination, 7 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 38 
(2006) (discussing whether Native Hawaiians should want to follow the model of the “domestic 
dependent nation” as a means of reaching self-determination). 
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antebellum Georgia prior to the attempts of the state legislature to destroy 
it, is a perfect example of how these concepts merge.  The Cherokee Nation 
entered into treaties with the United States that preserved millions of acres 
as a land base, with the United States promising to preserve those borders.  
The Cherokee Nation settled in for the long haul—engaging in farming and 
other economic development, developing a written tribal language and a 
tribal law, and establishing a governmental, economic, and cultural 
foundation for all time.  The United States had a trust responsibility to the 
Cherokee Nation—preserve the borders, by military force if necessary and 
preserve the treaty relationship. Meanwhile, the Cherokee Nation engaged 
in self-determination, much like Indian tribes do today. 
This trust relationship—self-determination dichotomy should have 
worked for the Cherokee Nation, just as it should work for tribes today.  
But that relationship with the United States became tainted, and corrupted 
by the betrayal of Andrew Jackson’s Executive Branch and by Congress, 
just as the relationship between all the other Indian tribes and the United 
States became tainted and corrupted by betrayal.  What should have a been 
a relationship that evolved into something like what the Vatican and 
Monaco have with their respective European hosts, devolved into weakness, 
dependence, and exploitation.  The modern trust relationship—self determi-
nation dichotomy retains the need for preservation of reservation bound-
aries (such as they are) and the need for self-determination, but it also 
includes a moral and legal obligation to restore tribes to the status they had 
when they entered into these treaties, or at least where they were headed 
before the betrayal of the United States. 
B. STATE AUTHORITY IN INDIAN COUNTRY 
Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion for the Court in Worcester v. Georgia 
stands as one of the strongest statements of tribal sovereignty in the history 
of American Indian law—“The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct commu-
nity occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in 
which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of 
Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees 
themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of congress.”183  
As Professor Robertson argued, it appears the Chief Justice’s argument 
about state and tribal sovereignty was tied to the Doctrine of Discovery and 
the right of the state and of the tribes to alienate and control land.184  In 
language that Professor Robertson argues was intended to reverse Johnson 
 
183. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 561 (1832). 
184. See generally ROBERTSON, supra note 4, at 133. 
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v. M’Intosh and eradicate the Doctrine of Discovery as controlling law, the 
Chief Justice quoted a speech from the British Superintendent of Indian 
Affairs from 1763, in which he stated that Indian lands may not be acquired 
except through “consent of all your people.”185 
Another argument to which the Chief Justice responded was the recur-
ring argument that Indian tribes were mere hunters that could not claim 
ownership over land, an argument based on the reference in the Treaty of 
Hopewell to “hunting grounds.”186  Chief Justice Marshall’s reply was more 
than adequate, relying on basic property law that the use of the land is not 
relevant to whether a person may own it.187  This was another argument 
related to the notion that the State of Georgia had control, and therefore 
jurisdiction, over Indian lands as a result of the Doctrine of Discovery. 
The legacy of Worcester as a legal hammer has been limited by sub-
sequent Supreme Court determinations, but the general rule that state law 
does not apply in Indian Country remains the law,188 subject to certain 
exceptions.189  In this portion of the Trilogy, whether state laws apply in 
Indian Country, a closer (and different than the plenary power—trust 
relationship dichotomy analysis) inspection of the protection and depend-
ence analysis is necessary.  The opinion tackled the argument Indian tribes 
had entered into the treaties with the general understanding that they were 
an inferior race giving themselves up to the “protection” of the United 
States.190  The Chief Justice concluded that Indian tribes hadn’t equated 
“protection” with “dependence” and, applying what we now know as the 
 
185. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 547. 
186. E.g., Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 22-24, 28 (1831) (Johnson, J., concurring); 
id. at 40 (Baldwin, J., concurring). 
187. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 553. 
So with respect to the words ‘hunting grounds.’  Hunting was at that time the principal 
occupation of the Indians, and their land was more used for that purpose than for any 
other. It could not, however, be supposed, that any intention existed of restricting the 
full use of the lands they reserved. To the United States, it could be a matter of no 
concern, whether their whole territory was devoted to hunting grounds, or whether an 
occasional village, and an occasional corn field, interrupted, and gave some variety to 
the scene.  
Id. 
188. E.g., Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Sac & Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114, 123 (1993); California v. 
Cabazon Band of Missions Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 221-22 (1987); Williams v. Lee, 359 U.S. 217, 
220-21 (1959). 
189. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (2000) (state criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country in some 
states); 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (2000) (state civil jurisdiction in Indian Country in some states); 
Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989) (state taxation of non-Indian owned 
businesses in Indian Country).  For a description of the current state of the law in relation to the 
extent that tribal sovereignty and federal interests combine to preempt state law in Indian Country, 
see Kaighn Smith, Jr., Federal Courts, State Power, and Indian Tribes: Confronting the Well-
Pleaded Complaint Rule, 35 N.M. L. REV. 1, 14-16 (2005). 
190. See Worcester, 31 U.S. at 546-57. 
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canon of construction of Indian treaty language, held that Indian tribes 
understood the word to mean that the United States would protect the tribes 
from intruders as in an international non-aggression treaty.191  Indian tribes 
would constitute a “dependent ally” of the United States, just as they had 
with the European powers previously: 
The general law of European sovereigns, respecting their claims in 
America, limited the intercourse of Indians, in a great degree, to 
the particular potentate whose ultimate right of domain was 
acknowledged by the others.  This was the general state of things 
in time of peace.  It was sometimes changed in war.  The 
consequence was, that their supplies were derived chiefly from 
that nation, and their trade confined to it.  Goods, indispensable to 
their comfort, in the shape of presents, were received from the 
same hand.  What was of still more importance, the strong hand of 
government was interposed to restrain the disorderly and licentious 
from intrusions into their country, from encroachments on their 
lands, and from those acts of violence which were often attended 
by reciprocal murder.  The Indians perceived in this protection 
only what was beneficial to themselves—an engagement to punish 
aggressions on them.  It involved, practically, no claim to their 
lands, no dominion over their persons.  It merely bound the nation 
to the British crown, as a dependent ally, claiming the protection 
of a powerful friend and neighbour, and receiving the advantages 
of that protection, without involving a surrender of their national 
character.192 
 
191. Id.  
Not well acquainted with the exact meaning of words, nor supposing it to be material 
whether they were called the subjects, or the children of their father in Europe; lavish 
in professions of duty and affection, in return for the rich presents they received; so 
long as their actual independence was untouched, and their right to self-government 
acknowledged, they were willing to profess dependence on the power which furnished 
supplies of which they were in absolute need, and restrained dangerous intruders from 
entering their country, and this was probably the sense in which the term was 
understood by them. 
Id. 
192. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 551-52; see also id. at 556. 
This treaty, thus explicitly recognizing [sic] the national character of the Cherokees, 
and their right of self- government; thus guarantying their lands; assuming the duty of 
protection, and, of course, pledging the faith of the United States for that protection; 
has been frequently renewed, and is now in full force. To the general pledge of 
protection have been added several specific pledges, deemed valuable by the Indians.  
Some of these restrain the citizens of the United States from encroachments on the 
Cherokee country, and provide for the punishment of intruders. 
Id. at 556. 
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In short, the word “protection” has no special meaning beyond that of, say, 
the Vatican giving in to the protection of Italy.  In this decision, the Chief 
Justice reversed his own position from a year earlier, in which he concluded 
that the word “protection” appeared in enough Indian treaties to justify 
labeling them “dependent.”193 
The Worcester opinion, which garnered a 5-1 majority, never refers to 
Indian tribes as “domestic dependent nations,” but instead refers to them as 
“independent” nations194 who are “dependent all[ies]” of the United 
States.195  This is a much, much different animal than the “domestic 
dependent nation” language that Chief Justice Marshall used in his lead 
opinion in Cherokee Nation.  But we still consider Indian tribes “domestic 
 
193. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831) (Marshall, C.J.). 
194. E.g., Worcester, 31 U.S. at 542-43 (“America, separated from Europe by a wide ocean, 
was inhabited by a distinct people, divided into separate nations, independent of each other, and of 
the rest of the world, having institutions of their own, and governing themselves by their own 
laws.”) (emphasis added); id. at 559 (“The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, 
independent, political communities, retaining their original natural rights, as the undisputed 
possessors of the soil, from time immemorial. . . .”) (emphasis added).  
A weak state, in order to provide for its safety, may place itself under the protection of 
one more powerful, without stripping itself of the right of government, and ceasing to 
be a state.  Examples of this kind are not wanting in Europe.  “Tributary and feudatory 
states,” says Vattel, “do not thereby cease to be sovereign and independent states, so 
long as self-government and sovereign and independent authority, are left in the 
administration of the state.”  At the present day, more than one state may be consid-
ered as holding its right of self-government under the guarantee and protection of one 
or more allies. 
Id. at 561 (emphasis added).  
It must be admitted, that the Indians sustain a peculiar relation to the United States.  
They do not constitute, as was decided at the last term, a foreign state, so as to claim 
the right to sue in the supreme court of the United States; and yet, having the right of 
self government, they, in some sense, form a state. In the management of their internal 
concerns, they are dependent on no power. 
Id. at 581 (McLean, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
195. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 552. 
The Indians perceived in this protection only what was beneficial to themselves—an 
engagement to punish aggressions on them.  It involved, practically, no claim to their 
lands, no dominion over their persons.  It merely bound the nation to the British 
crown, as a dependent ally, claiming the protection of a powerful friend and neigh-
bour, and receiving the advantages of that protection, without involving a surrender of 
their national character. 
Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 555. 
The Indian nations were, from their situation, necessarily dependent on some foreign 
potentate, for the supply of their essential wants, and for their protection from lawless 
and injurious intrusions into their country.”); id. at 582 (M’Lean, J., concurring) 
(“Every state is more or less dependent on those which surround it; but, unless this 
dependence shall extend so far as to merge the political existence of the protected 
people into that of their protectors, they may still constitute a state. They may exercise 
the powers not relinquished, and bind themselves as a distinct and separate 
community. 
Id.  at 555. 
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dependent nations” anyway.196  How did this happen?  This line of thought 
is a good exercise for the beginning student of American Indian law to 
consider. 
C. IMPLICIT DIVESTITURE 
Implicit divestiture is introduced in Johnson, Chief Justice Marshall 
deciding that, as a function of the Doctrine of Discovery, Indian tribes 
would no longer retain the right to alienate property to any party except the 
United States.197  The Cherokee Nation holding amounts to an implicit 
divestiture of the tribal authority to engage in foreign affairs,198 such as 
entering into a binding treaty with Spain or France or Great Britain.  By 
definition, no treaty or statute or other form of tribal consent exists to 
support or authorize an implicit divestiture of tribal authority.  What 
 
196. E.g., United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 199 (2004) (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 
102-261, at 3-4 (1991)); id. at 204-05 (quoting Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17); Okla. Tax 
Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 509 (1991) (same); 
Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 699 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. 
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978)); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima 
Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 451 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting 
COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 235 (Nell Jessup Newton ed., 2005)); Merrion v. 
Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 141 (1982); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 215 (1962) 
(quoting Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17); Roff v. Burney, 168 U.S. 218, 221 (1897) (same); Hope 
Babcock, A Civic-Republican Vision of “Domestic Dependent Nations” in the Twenty-First 
Century: Tribal Sovereignty Re-Envisioned, Reinvigorated, and Re-empowered, 2005 UTAH L. 
REV. 443; Matthew L.M. Fletcher, In Pursuit of Tribal Economic Development as a Substitute for 
Reservation Tax Revenue, 80 N.D. L. REV. 759, 762, 763 (2004); Sarah Krakoff, A Narrative of 
Sovereignty: Illuminating the Paradox of the Domestic Dependent Nation, 83 OR. L. REV. 1109 
(2004); Heinrich Krieger, Principles of the Indian Law and the Act of June 18, 1934, 3 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 279, 282 (1935); Dudley O. McGovney, American Citizenship, 11 COLUM. L. 
REV. 326, 326, 330 (1911); Editorial, Legal Status of the Indians—Validity of Indian Marriages, 
13 YALE L.J. 250, 251 (1903). 
197. See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 574 (1823).  
In the establishment of these relations, the rights of the original inhabitants were, in no 
instance, entirely disregarded; but were necessarily, to a considerable extent, 
impaired.  They were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as 
well as just claim to retain possession of it, and to use it according to their own discre-
tion; but their rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily 
diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever 
they pleased, was denied by the original fundamental principle, that discovery gave 
exclusive title to those who made it. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
198. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17. 
In all our intercourse with foreign nations, in our commercial regulations, in any 
attempt at intercourse between Indians and foreign nations, they are considered as 
within the jurisdictional limits of the United States, subject to many of those restraints 
which are imposed upon our own citizens.  They acknowledge themselves in their 
treaties to be under the protection of the United States; they admit that the United 
States shall have the sole and exclusive right of regulating the trade with them, and 
managing all their affairs as they think proper . . . . 
Id. 
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implicit divestiture amounts to is a decision by the Supreme Court that it 
will not recognize certain exercises of tribal authority.199  For over 140 
years after the Marshall Trilogy, the Supreme Court rarely (if ever) 
announced another instance of implicit divestiture.200 
In the reincarnation of the implicit divestiture doctrine during the 
Burger Court—in cases such as Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe201 and 
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation202—the 
Court adopted a rule that the inherent or retained powers of Indian tribes 
would not be divested by the Court absent the “overriding interests of the 
National Government.”203  This is consistent with the holding in Johnson 
and the understanding of the Marshall Court as evidenced in dicta. For 
example, the Court often refers to the “necessity” of the European powers 
to follow the Doctrine of Discovery.204  The national interest may be fear of 
military violence205 or protection of national economic interests and tax 
 
199. E.g., Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001) (refusing to recognize the tribal court 
authority to adjudicate a federal civil rights claim against a state officer); A-1 Contractors v. 
Strate, 520 U.S. 438 (1997) (refusing to recognize the tribal court authority to adjudicate a civil 
case involving nonmembers outside of Indian Country); Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990) 
(refusing to recognize the tribal authority to prosecute nonmember Indians); Oliphant v. 
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (refusing to recognize the tribal authority to 
prosecute non-Indians). 
200. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978).  Wheeler lists three areas in 
which the Court recognized implicit divestiture:  
The areas in which such implicit divestiture of sovereignty has been held to have 
occurred are those involving the relations between an Indian tribe and nonmembers of 
the tribe.  Thus, Indian tribes can no longer freely alienate to non-Indians the land they 
occupy. [Johnson.]  They cannot enter into direct commercial or governmental rela-
tions with foreign nations.  [Worcester; Cherokee Nation.]  And, as we have recently 
held, they cannot try nonmembers in tribal courts.  [Oliphant.] 
Id. (other citations omitted). 
201. 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (holding that Indian tribes had no authority to prosecute 
nonmembers).  Of interest in reference to the criminal jurisdiction question, Justice Johnson in his 
Cherokee Nation concurrence notes that Indian tribes, such as the Catawba nation, were not only 
“punishing intruders,” Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 24 (Johnson, J., concurring), but perhaps 
executing them as well.  Id. at 25. 
202. 447 U.S. 134 (1980). 
203. Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. at 153. 
204. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 590 (1823). 
205. E.g., Johnson, 21 U.S. at 596-97. 
The peculiar situation of the Indians, necessarily considered, in some respects, as a 
dependent, and in some respects as a distinct people, occupying a country claimed by 
Great Britain, and yet too powerful and brave not to be dreaded as formidable 
enemies, required, that means should be adopted for the preservation of peace; and 
that their friendship should be secured by quieting their alarms for their property.  
This was to be effected by restraining the encroachments of the whites; and the power 
to do this was never, we believe, denied by the colonies to the crown. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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revenue,206 but it was national interest that spurred the very first implicit 
divestiture holding. 
But the modern Court’s implicit divestiture doctrine does not focus on 
overriding interests of the Nation, but instead on a more standardless rule, 
whether the tribal authority was lost “by virtue of their dependent status.”207  
Instead of relying on a national interest, the modern Court has far more 
discretion to determine the extent of the tribes’ “dependent status.”  Once 
again, dependency looms large.  Distinctiveness and independence are 
forgotten. 
D. CANON OF CONSTRUCTION OF INDIAN TREATIES 
The venerable canons of construction of Indian treaties208 originate in 
language within the Marshall Trilogy.  In Worcester, Chief Justice Marshall 
held that treaty language should be interpreted in accordance to “the sense 
by which [the language] was understood by [the Indians].”209  The language 
in which the United States and the tribes negotiated treaties was English 
and the Chief Justice recognized that Indian treaty negotiators were “[n]ot 
well acquainted with the exact meaning of words . . .”210 nor were they 
“critical judges of our language . . . .”211  As a result, the Worcester Court 
twice interpreted treaty language to the benefit of the Cherokee Nation.212 
Some of the greatest victories achieved by Indian tribes have been in 
reliance on the canon that ambiguities in Indian treaties should be 
 
206. E.g., id. at 586. 
The States, having within their chartered limits different portions of territory covered 
by Indians, ceded that territory, generally, to the United States, on conditions 
expressed in their deeds of cession, which demonstrate the opinion, that they ceded the 
soil as well as jurisdiction, and that in doing so, they granted a productive fund to the 
government of the Union.  The lands in controversy lay within the chartered limits of 
Virginia, and were ceded with the whole country northwest of the river Ohio.  This 
grant contained reservations and stipulations, which could only be made by the owners 
of the soil; and concluded with a stipulation, that “all the lands in the ceded territory, 
not reserved, should be considered as a common fund, for the use and benefit of such 
of the United States as have become, or shall become, members of the confederation,” 
[etc.] “according to their usual respective proportions in the general charge and 
expenditure, and shall be faithfully and bona fide disposed of for that purpose, and for 
no other use or purpose whatsoever.” 
Id. (emphasis added). 
207. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978). 
208. The canons of construction of Indian treaties are described in great detail by the Navajo 
Supreme Court in Means v. Distr. Court of the Chinle Judicial Distr., No. SC-CV-61-98, 
1999.NANN.0000013, at ¶¶ 54-59 (May 11, 1999), available at http://www.tribal-institute.org/ 
opinions/1999.NANN.0000013.htm. 
209. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 547 (1832). 
210. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 546-47. 
211. Id. at 552. 
212. See id. at 547 (“protection”); id. at 553-54 (“manage all their affairs”). 
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interpreted to the benefit of the tribal interest.  Fishing rights,213 water 
rights,214 hunting rights,215 and tribal sovereign rights216 have all been 
vindicated under this theory for many tribes.  But the Supreme Court’s 
recent hostility toward tribal interests has exposed a weakness in the 
argument.  The canons apply only if the Court finds the treaty language 
ambiguous.217  Since whether treaty language is ambiguous is a question of 
law, the Court has free reign to decide that treaty language is not ambiguous 
and interpret it against the tribal interest.  In fact, that is how the concurring 
Justices would have held in Cherokee Nation,218 interpreting the treaty 
language as they saw it, with no reference to the history of Indian-white 
relations and the context of a particular negotiation. 
E. POLITICAL STATUS 
Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Johnson presaged this differential 
treatment and its potential impacts (impressive, given that the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was decades away) when 
he wrote, again, as always in dicta, “When the conquest is complete, and 
the conquered inhabitants can be blended with the conquerors, or safely 
governed as a distinct people . . . .”219  Again, Indians and Indian tribes, 
according to the Chief Justice, are either “distinct” or “blended” into the 
American state.  “Distinct” tribes remain apart, like the Cherokee Nation, 
even though they are surrounded by the territory of a State, such as Georgia. 
One current debate raging in the field is whether the political status of 
Indians, or the special relationship between Indians, Indian tribes, and the 
federal government, validates differential treatment of Indians under the 
Equal Protection Clause.220  Many students may be surprised to learn that 
 
213. E.g., Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 
658 (1979); Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Voigt, 700 F.2d 341 
(7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192 (W.D. Mich. 1979). 
214. E.g., Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908). 
215. E.g., Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999). 
216. E.g., McClanahan v. State Tax Comm’n of Ariz., 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Keweenaw Bay 
Indian Cmty. v. Naftaly, 452 F.3d 514 (6th Cir. 2006); Keweenaw Bay Indian Cmty. v. Michigan, 
784 F. Supp. 418 (W.D. Mich. 1991). 
217. See South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329 (1998); Hagen v. Utah, 510 
U.S. 399 (1994). 
218. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1831) (Johnson, J., concurring); id. 
at 37-39 (Baldwin, J., concurring). 
219. See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 589-90 (1823) (emphasis added). 
220. E.g., Artichoke Joe’s Grand Nation Casino v. Norton, 353 F.3d 712 (9th Cir. 2003); 
Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657 (9th Cir. 1997) (Kozinski, J.); In re Santos Y., 110 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 1; 90 Cal. App. 4th 1026 (2001); Goldberg-Ambrose, Not “Strictly” Racial, supra note 16; L. 
Scott Gould, Mixing Bodies and Beliefs: The Predicament of Tribes, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 702 
(2001); Stuart Minor Benjamin, Equal Protection and the Special Relationship: The Case of 
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differing governmental treatment of Indians—both positive and negative—
is not race-based, but is instead based on what the Court labeled the 
“political status” of Indian tribes.221  But more critical is the fact that Indian 
tribes have a treaty relationship with the federal government, with states, or, 
in cases that predate the Declaration of Independence, with other nations.  
And that treaty relationship has evolved into a federal recognition of tribal 
sovereignty as a political matter.  As a result, the “political” status of Indian 
tribes remains extant.  But this conclusion can be challenged in a manner 
that beginning students of American Indian law should understand. 
As a teaching matter, the political status of Indian tribes—as opposed 
to a race-based status—as implied in the Trilogy, is an important first step 
in tracing the relationship between the federal government and individual 
Indians.  In the Constitution, Indians were not citizens and therefore not 
taxed.222  In the post-Civil War amendments to the Constitution, Indians 
were not citizens and therefore not taxed.223  It was not until the Indian 
Citizenship Act224 in 1924 that Congress extended citizenship to all 
American Indians.  Although few beyond academia225 consider the 
questions, what about those American Indians who did not consent to 
American citizenship?  And can an American Indian born after 1924 reject 
citizenship? 
F. LACHES AND “SETTLED EXPECTATIONS” 
The importance of preserving the land transactions that established the 
current regime of property ownership was established in Johnson.226  Chief 
Justice Marshall reasoned that to disrupt the long-standing tradition of 
acquiring lands from Indians in accordance with the Doctrine of Discovery 
would upset the entirety of property ownership and undermine the govern-
ments of “New England, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, 
 
Native Hawaiians, 106 YALE L.J. 537 (1996); Goldberg, American Indians and “Preferential” 
Treatment, supra note 16; Valencia-Weber, Racial Equality, supra note 16; David C. Williams, 
The Borders of the Equal Protection Clause: Indians as Peoples, 38 UCLA L. REV. 759 (1991). 
221. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S 535, 553 n.24 (1974). 
222. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. 
223. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. 
224. See 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (2000). 
225. E.g., VINE DELORIA, JR. & DAVID E. WILKINS, TRIBES, TREATIES, AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBULATIONS 141-48 (1999); David Wilkins, The Manipulation of Indigenous 
Status: The Federal Government as Shape-Shifter, 12 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 223, 228 (2001); 
Clinton, There is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, supra note 123, at 246-52; 
Robert B. Porter, The Demise of the Ongwehoweh and the Rise of Native Americans: Redressing 
the Genocidal Act of Forcing American Citizenship upon Indigenous Peoples, 15 HARV. 
BLACKLETTER L. J. 107 (1999). 
226. See Johnson, 21 U.S. at 579-80. 
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and a part of the Carolinas.”227  Often, Chief Justice Marshall stated that the 
doctrine cannot even be “questioned.”228 
The standard story of Johnson v. M’Intosh is that it forms the 
“foundational principle of American property law—that some government, 
whether state or federal, is at the root of all land titles in the United States, 
because the original fee simple owner of all the country’s land was the 
government, not the Indians.”229  But of course this is an oversimplification, 
as every individual land transaction between Indians and non-Indians must 
be scrutinized to determine whether the transaction was valid.  This is not 
such an easy task, despite some blithe assertions.230  But oversimplifications 
are necessary to preserve the settled expectations of whatever property 
interests are at stake.  Chief Justice Marshall’s oversimplification of the 
history of the Doctrine of Discovery helped to preserve the expectations of 
much of the original thirteen colonies.  And now the Supreme Court and 
lower courts rely upon oversimplifications of tribal histories to deny Indian 
lands claims.231  In another common oversimplification, Professor Judith 
Younger suggested that historical Indian land transactions should be 
analyzed in light of the multi-billion dollar Indian gaming industry.232  A 
recent Harvard Law Review note argued that Indian land claims are no 
 
227. Id.  
The governments of New-England, New-York, New-Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, 
and a part of Carolina, were thus created.  In all of them, the soil, at the time the grants 
were made, was occupied by the Indians.  Yet almost every title within those govern-
ments is dependent on these grants.  In some instances, the soil was conveyed by the 
crown unaccompanied by the powers of government, as in the case of the northern 
neck of Virginia.  It has never been objected to this, or to any other similar grant, that 
the title as well as possession was in the Indians when it was made, and that it passed 
nothing on that account. 
Id. 
228. Id. at 591. 
229. BANNER, supra note 32, at 178. 
230. See Judith T. Younger, Whose America?, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 241, 249 (2005) 
(reviewing BANNER, supra note 32, and ROBERTSON, supra note 4) (“The argument, thought up 
by some ingenious lawyer, goes something like this: we sold our land; the law prohibited us from 
selling it without federal consent; we didn’t have federal consent; the sale was therefore void; the 
land is still ours!”) (citations omitted). 
231. See, e.g., City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197 (2005); Cayuga Indian 
Nation v. Pataki, 413 F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. denied sub nom., United States v. Pataki, 126 
S. Ct. 2021 (2006). 
232. See Younger, supra note 230, at 249. 
Professor Banner’s discussion of the balance of power between Indians and non-
Indians contains no mention of Indian gaming.  In 2004, casinos on Indian reserva-
tions took in about $18.5 billion in gross revenues.  This seems so significant an 
amount that it is hard to see how it could not affect the calculus of political power. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
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more than claims for reparations, which is yet another oversimplification.233  
These oversimplifications create genuine injury for Indian nations without 
significant gaming revenues in their attempts to restore their lost land base 
or their political stability, both of which were guaranteed by treaty, statute, 
and federal policy.  These oversimplifications also create genuine injury for 
Indian nations who have never stopped trying to preserve their nationhood 
and their cultures.  It is natural for those retaining Indian property interests 
in violation of federal law (or those defending the retention of the interests) 
to resort to such oversimplifications.234  But it is a disappointing exercise in 
the use of rhetoric to justify historical injury. 
Members of the Marshall Court were concerned that opening the 
courthouse door to one tribe might mean that more Indian tribes would 
knock on the door.  In Justice Baldwin’s concurrence in Cherokee Nation, 
he argued that for the Court to declare that the Cherokee Nation could bring 
suit against the State of Georgia would create “endless controversies” from 
“countless tribes.”235  Justice Baldwin, presaging the late Rehnquist Court, 
wrote in another segment of his Cherokee Nation opinion that “Indian 
sovereignty cannot be roused from its long slumber” by judicial fiat.236  In 
City of Sherrill, the Court held, “We now reject the unification theory of 
[Oneida Indian Nation] and the United States and hold that standards of 
federal Indian law and federal equity practice preclude the Tribe from 
rekindling embers of sovereignty that long ago grew cold.”237  And so it 
goes. 
 
233. See Note, Availability of Equitable Relief, 119 HARV. L. REV. 347, 348 (2005) (“[City 
of Sherrill] was correct because the Court was poorly positioned to adjudicate the claims; 
therefore, these claims are best understood as demands for reparative justice that raised the typical 
difficulties associated with reparations.”). 
234. Cf. REINHOLD NIEBUHR, MORAL MAN AND IMMORAL SOCIETY: A STUDY IN ETHICS 
AND POLITICS xv (1932) (Charles Scribner’s Sons ed., 1952) (“Contending factions in a social 
struggle require morale; and morale is created by the right dogmas, symbols and emotionally 
potent oversimplifications.”). 
235. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 32 (1831) (Baldwin, J., concurring).  
My view of the plaintiffs being a sovereign independent nation or foreign state, within 
the meaning of the constitution, applies to all the tribes with whom the Unites States 
have held treaties: for if one is a foreign nation or state, all others in like condition 
must be so in their aggregate capacity; and each of their subjects or citizens, aliens, 
capable of suing in the circuit courts.  This case then is the case of the countless tribes, 
who occupy tracts of our vast domain; who, in their collective and individual 
characters, as states or aliens, will rush to the federal courts in endless controversies, 
growing out of the laws of the states or of congress. 
Id.  
236. Id. at 47 (Baldwin, J., concurring). 
237. City of Sherrill, 544 U.S. at 214 (quotation marks and footnote omitted). 
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G. SELF-GOVERNMENT & TRIBAL LAW 
The Marshall Court often acknowledged in passing the existence and 
viability of tribal law.  While a sale of Indian lands to an individual might 
not be cognizable in an American court, the person purchasing the lands 
must follow tribal law in order to realize rights and benefits from those 
lands: 
If an individual might extinguish the Indian title for his own bene-
fit, or, in other words, might purchase it, still he could acquire only 
that title.  Admitting their power to change their laws or usages, so 
far as to allow an individual to separate a portion of their lands 
from the common stock, and hold it in severalty, still it is a part of 
their territory, and is held under them, by a title dependent on their 
laws.  The grant derives its efficacy from their will; and, if they 
choose to resume it, and make a different disposition of the land, 
the Courts of the United States cannot interpose for the protection 
of the title.  The person who purchases lands from the Indians, 
within their territory, incorporates himself with them, so far as 
respects the property purchased; holds their title under their 
protection, and subject to their laws.  If they annul the grant, we 
know of no tribunal which can revise and set aside the proceeding.  
We know of no principle which can distinguish this case from a 
grant made to a native Indian, authorizing him to hold a particular 
tract of land in severalty.238 
Meanwhile, Justice Johnson, in his Cherokee Nation concurrence, argued 
that Indian tribes had no government or laws and existed in a “savage 
state.”239 
The Court always has been hit or miss when it comes to recognizing 
the validity of tribal law, much of which is unwritten, unavailable, or 
inapplicable to nonmembers.240  Modern federal Indian law does recognize 
the validity of tribal law in areas involving tribal member interests in Indian 
 
238. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 593 (1823). 
239. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 27-28 (Johnson, J., concurring). 
But I think it very clear that the constitution neither speaks of them as states or foreign 
states, but as just what they were, Indian tribes; an anomaly unknown to the books that 
treat of states, and which the law of nations would regard as nothing more than 
wandering hordes, held together only by ties of blood and habit, and having neither 
laws or government, beyond what is required in a savage state. 
Id.  
240. See generally Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Toward a Theory of Intertribal and Intratribal 
Common Law, 43 HOUSTON L. REV. 701, 728-33 (2006) (arguing that intratribal common law is 
not applicable to nonmembers except when they consent). 
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Country,241 but no longer to the extent that the Trilogy anticipated.  A 
critical area of dispute in modern federal Indian law is the extent to which 
Indian tribes and tribal courts have civil jurisdiction over nonmembers.242  
The Court’s current precedents hold that the presumption is against tribal 
jurisdiction.243  Justice Marshall’s Johnson opinion implied that when non-
Indians wander into Indian Country and engage in transactions with the 
Indians, they were subject to tribal laws.  A critical teaching point in any 
Indian law class is following the story of how the law changed over time, 
despite the fact that Congress has never spoken on the subject of tribal court 
civil jurisdiction except in support of its exercise.244 
H. POLITICAL QUESTIONS 
The Marshall Court, at the time of the Trilogy, was still sorting out its 
power in the context of the Constitution’s separation of powers.245  The 
Court sowed the seeds of what would become known as the political 
question doctrine.246  The Trilogy advanced the political question doctrine. 
Justice Johnson, in his Cherokee Nation concurrence, argued that, while the 
State of Georgia may have violated the Cherokee treaties, it was up to the 
executive to make the Cherokee Nation whole.247  Professor Philip Bobbitt 
 
241. E.g., Williams v. Lee, 359 U.S. 217 (1959) (holding that tribal courts have exclusive 
jurisdiction over claims brought against tribal members in disputes arising in Indian Country); 
Kobogum v. Jackson Iron Co., 43 N.W. 602 (Mich. 1889) (recognizing a tribal marriage). 
242. Compare A-1 Contractors v. Strate, 520 U.S. 438 (1997) (holding that the tribal court 
did not have civil adjudicatory jurisdiction over a suit involving nonmembers), with Smith v. 
Salish Kootenai College, 434 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (holding that the tribal court did have 
civil adjudicatory jurisdiction over a suit involving nonmembers and a tribal entity), cert. denied, 
126 S. Ct. 2893 (2006). 
243. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 560-61 (1981). 
244. See generally Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court and Federal Indian Policy, 
85 NEB. L. REV. 121 (2006). 
245. See generally MCCLOSKEY, supra note 161, at 35-52; George L. Haskins, Law Versus 
Politics in the Early Years of the Marshall Court, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1981). 
246. See Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question 
Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 207, 246-53 (2002); Wilkins, 
Reinvigoration, supra note 225, at 8-10. 
247. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 30 (1831) (Johnson, J., concurring). 
What these people may have a right to claim of the executive power is one thing: 
whether we are to be the instruments to compel another branch of the government to 
make good the stipulations of treaties, is a very different question.  Courts of justice 
are properly excluded from all considerations of policy, and therefore are very unfit 
instruments to control the action of that branch of government; which may often be 
compelled by the highest considerations of public policy to withhold even the exercise 
of a positive duty. 
Id. 
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argued that the Cherokee Nation would not have prevailed even if the Court 
held that the Nation was a “foreign State.”248 
After the retirement of Chief Justice Marshall, the Court often relied 
upon the political question doctrine to avoid difficult questions of Indian 
law. In United States v. Rogers, the Court wrote, “But had it been 
otherwise, and were the right and the propriety of exercising this power 
now open to question, yet it is a question for the law making and political 
department of the government, and not for the judicial.”249  The Court 
relied on this doctrine again and again—to uphold federal criminal 
jurisdiction in Indian Country;250 to uphold the federal government’s treaty 
interpretation;251 to uphold the federal government’s unilateral abrogation 
of Indian treaty rights;252 to uphold the extinguishment of Indian title;253 
and to alienate tribal property without tribal consent.254  Only since the late 
1970s has the Court backed down from its assertion of the political question 
doctrine,255 but the Court has not struck down a statute that abrogates a 
treaty right. 
I. RACISM 
No discussion of the Trilogy is complete without a full reckoning of the 
racism inherent in the holdings or the racism of the reasoning behind the 
holdings.  Indians are labeled “fierce savages,”256 prone to massacring 
helpless non-Indians,257 and always, always, always “gradually sinking.”258  
 
248. See BOBBITT, supra note 73, at 114-15. 
If [Marshall] had accepted jurisdiction on the basis urged and had been willing to 
regard the Cherokee as a foreign nation, the Court would have been unable to oversee 
a decree and would have had to abandon the issue as a constitutional matter.  This 
follows from our Constitution’s commitment of foreign relations largely to the 
Executive.  Had the Indians been truly a “foreign state” the Constitution and the Court 
could have offered them no protection.   
Id.  But see BANNER, supra note 32, at 216-17 (“When government officials insist that they lack 
the legal authority to do something, it is virtually always something they would prefer not to do, 
and that is especially true when it is something that previous administrations had always done.  
But of course that was no help to the Cherokees.”). 
249. United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 567, 572 (1846) (emphasis added). 
250. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 380-81 (1886). 
251. See United States v. Sandoval, 167 U.S. 278, 290 (1897). 
252. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903); Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264, 271 
(1898); The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. 616, 621 (1870). 
253. See United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 347 (1941). 
254. See Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 294, 307-08 (1902). 
255. See United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 413 (1980); Delaware 
Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 84 (1977). 
256. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 590 (1823). 
257. See id. at 590.  
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Justice Baldwin took the view that the earliest Indian cases before the Court 
gave the members an opportunity to nip Indian claims in the bud before 
they became a problem, as in the “maxim obsta principiis.”259 
The superiority of Euro-American culture was never in question.  As 
Euro-American populations advanced, “that of the Indians necessarily 
receded.”260  The entire Marshall Court, it appears, was bamboozled by one 
of the greatest lies ever perpetrated about Indian people—that Indians were 
hunters and were not (and could not) be farmers.  Contemporaneous to the 
Marshall Trilogy, Henry Schoolcraft, the well-connected Jacksonian 
charged with surveying the Old Northwest, wrote in 1827 that “[o]ld green 
fields appeared in spots [on Mackinac Island], which have been formerly 
cultivated by Indians.”261  A Detroit newspaper editorial gaped in 1831, 
“The largest corn I ever saw was raised on these prairies.”262  And the 
Cherokee Nation had a surplus of food.263  According to the Court, 
however, Euro-American farmers advanced, pushing the Indian “hunters” 
away into the “unbroken forest.”264  Under their reasoning, Indian lands 
used for hunting were not owned; in fact, they were “vacant.”265 
Justice Johnson’s opinion in Cherokee Nation may be one of the most 
racist opinions ever published by a Supreme Court Justice.  Justice 
Johnson’s opinion was that an Indian tribe could not be a “state,” as defined 
in international law, for the reason that Indian people were too “low” for 
that designation.266  Justice Johnson’s opinion is littered with the 
 
The Europeans were under the necessity either of abandoning the country, and 
relinquishing their pompous claims to it, or of enforcing those claims by the sword, 
and by the adoption of principles adapted to the condition of a people with whom it 
was impossible to mix, and who could not be governed as a distinct society, or of 
remaining in their neighbourhood, and exposing themselves and their families to the 
perpetual hazard of being massacred. 
Id. 
258. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 15 (1831). 
259. Id. at 32 (Baldwin, J., concurring) (writing “[i]n the spirit of the maxim obsta 
principiis,” or to resist the first encroachment). 
260. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 590. 
261. W.B. HINSDALE, THE FIRST PEOPLE OF MICHIGAN 146 (1930). 
262. Id. 
263. See Wishart, supra note 76. 
264. See Johnson, 32 U.S. at 590-91 (“The country in the immediate neighborhood of 
agriculturalists became unfit for [the Indians].  The game fled into thicker and more unbroken 
forest, and the Indians followed.”). 
265. Id. at 596 (“[N]o distinction was taken between vacant lands and lands occupied by the 
Indians.”). 
266. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 21 (1831) (Johnson, J., concurring) (“I 
cannot but think that there are strong reasons for doubting the applicability of the epithet state, to 
a people so low in the grade of organized society as our Indian tribes most generally are.”) 
(emphasis in original). 
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proposition that Indians were no more than “hunters.”267  He seems to focus 
on this term because of a throwaway line in the Treaty of Hopewell, a treaty 
signed by the Cherokee Nation and the fledgling United States after the 
Revolutionary War, defining the territorial lands of the Nation by a 
rhetorical term as “hunting grounds.”268  The twisted irony of Justice 
Johnson’s opinion is that he accepts that the Cherokee Nation is moving 
away from being a mere “race of hunters”269 to a viable and “approved 
form[] of civil government.”270  As such, he reasoned, because the Nation 
was moving away from its “hunter” state to a more civilized state, it made 
perfect sense for state law to apply.271  Justice Johnson found the federal 
goal of civilizing Indians laudable, but believed that, due to the “restless, 
warlike, and signally cruel” nature of Indian people and the “inveterate 
habits and deep seated enmity” of Indian tribes, such a goal had failed.272  
Such language gives great fodder for commentators to decry federal Indian 
law as racist.273 
 
267. Id. at 22, 23, 24, 28 (“band of hunters” and “hunter horde”). 
268. Id. at 23 (quoting Treaty of Hopewell, art IV); see also id. at 40 (Baldwin, J., 
concurring). 
269. Id. at 23 (Johnson, J., concurring). 
270. Id. at 21 (“I would not here be understood as speaking of the Cherokees under their 
present form of government; which certainly must be classed among the most approved forms of 
civil government.”). 
271. Id. at 23. 
The pre-emptive right, and exclusive right of conquest in case of war [the Doctrine of 
Discovery], was never questioned to exist in the states, which circumscribed the whole 
or any part of the Indian grounds or territory.  To have taken it from them by direct 
means would have been a palpable violation of their rights.  But every advance, from 
the hunter state to a more fixed state of society, must have a tendency to impair that 
pre-emptive right, and ultimately to destroy it altogether, both by increasing the Indian 
population, and by attaching them firmly to the soil.  The hunter state bore within 
itself the promise of vacating the territory, because when game ceased, the hunter 
would go elsewhere to seek it.  But a more fixed state of society would amount to a 
permanent destruction of the hope, and, of consequence, of the beneficial character of 
the pre-emptive right. 
Id. 
272. Id. at 23-24. 
But it is said, that we have extended to them the means and inducement to become 
agricultural and civilized.  It is true: and the immediate object of that policy was so 
obvious as probably to have intercepted the view of ulterior consequences.  Independ-
ently of the general influence of humanity, these people were restless, warlike, and 
signally cruel in their irruptions during the revolution.  The policy, therefore, of en-
ticing them to the arts of peace, and to those improvements which war might lay 
desolate, was obvious; and it was wise to prepare them for what was probably then 
contemplated, to wit, to incorporate them in time into our respective governments: a 
policy which their inveterate habits and deep seated enmity has altogether baffled. 
Id. 
273. See ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST COURT, 
INDIAN RIGHTS AND THE LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA (2005); Stacy L. Leeds, The 
More Things Stay the Same: Waiting on Indian Law’s Brown v. Board of Education, 38 TULSA L. 
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III. REASSESSING OF THE TRILOGY 
Students of American Indian law can learn the holdings of the Trilogy 
without much trouble, but the Trilogy occupies a much greater place in 
American law than its mere holdings.  As was true in much of Chief Justice 
Marshall’s greatest work,274 the more important decisions came in obiter 
dicta, as the previous Parts suggest.  But, perhaps more important than the 
holdings and the dicta, is the Trilogy’s impact on and restatement of 
American history and legend.  This section reassesses the Trilogy using 
several methodologies of legal analysis, including legal history, law and 
literature (and mythology), law and economics, and the legal canon. 
A. THE TRILOGY AS HISTORY 
History is written by the victors, as the old saw goes.275  And legal 
history often accomplishes the same.  As Morton Horwitz wrote of Roscoe 
Pound’s work in legal history: “The main thrust of lawyer’s legal history, 
then, is to pervert the real function of history by reducing it to the pathetic 
role of justifying the world as it is.”276  Chief Justice Marshall’s frequent 
reference to the “actual state of things”277 was, according to Professor Bob 
Miller, a reference to the historical “fact” “that the reality was . . . ‘power, 
war, conquest, give rights, which, after possession, are conceded by the 
world.’”278  For the American mind, the question was whether American 
Indians were weak because they were colonized or they were colonized 
because they were weak. The English decided it one way—the latter: 
As the English consolidated their empire, they made it look as if 
their using violent means to subjugate or disperse native popula-
tions was beside the point.  Nature demonstrated that Indians were 
removed from the prospect of life in America.  Their bodies were 
 
REV. 73, 79, 82, 85 (2002); LaVelle, Rescuing Paha Sapa, supra note 164, at 78 n.133 (“In my 
view, federal Indian policy is and always has been infected with powerful strains of both racism 
and colonialism.”); Robert A. Williams, Jr., Columbus’s Legacy: Law as an Instrument of Racial 
Discrimination against Indigenous Peoples’ Rights of Self-Determination, 8 ARIZ. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 51 (1991). 
274. E.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824); McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 
(1819); Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803). 
275. See Lawrence M. Friedman, Introduction to 4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 437, 
438-39 (2003) (“History has winners and losers, and the winners usually control and dominate the 
way history gets written.  Their story becomes the story; and the story of the losers ends up lost or 
distorted.”). 
276. Morton J. Horwitz, The Conservative Tradition in the Writing of American Legal 
History, 17 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 275, 281 (1973). 
277. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 591 (1823); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 543, 
546, 560 (1832). 
278. Miller, supra note 53, at 72 (quoting Worcester, 31 U.S. at 543). 
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conceived as unsuited to the places the English had settled, their 
forms of medicine were adequate to treat their continuing debility, 
and their conceptions of nature did not promise an easy transition 
to English learning.  Indians did not belong in the plantations the 
English had made in America.  They were uprooted.279 
In other words, “[t]he indigenous were stripped of significant presence on 
the land they inhabited not as a condition for colonizing but as a conse-
quence of it.”280  But for Chief Justice Marshall, attempting to preserve a 
strong national government in Worcester, the strength of the Cherokee 
Nation was critical as a practical matter to limiting the authority of the State 
of Georgia to nullify federal law.  Moreover, for Marshall, who had once 
feared the possibility that the Indians would push America into the sea,281 to 
admit to British superiority over Indians was (possibly) to admit to Ameri-
can inferiority to Britain.  He had to have it both ways: in Johnson, he 
needed weak, dependent Indians; in Worcester, he needed strong, inde-
pendent Indians.  And the Court, over the decades and centuries, imagines 
its Indians as was necessary to reach its holdings.282 
The “actual state of things” has ripened in the modern Court into the 
way things “ought to be.”283  History is used, as it so often is by jurists 
claiming to be “originalists,”284 to reach a particular result consistent with 
 
279. JOYCE E. CHAPLIN, SUBJECT MATTER: TECHNOLOGY, THE BODY, AND SCIENCE ON 
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN FRONTIER, 1500-1676, 320 (2001), quoted in Christopher Tomlins, In a 
Wilderness of Tigers: Violence, the Discourse of English Colonizing, and the Refusals of 
American History, 4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 451, 453 n.2 (2003). 
280. Tomlins, supra note 279, at 453. 
281. See BROWN, supra note 22, at 213 (“The Indians were a fierce and dangerous enemy 
whose love of war made them sometimes the aggressors, whose numbers and habits made them 
formidable, and whose cruel system of warfare seemed to justify every endeavor to remove them 
to a distance from civilized settlements.”) (quoting an 1828 letter from Chief Justice Marshall to 
Justice Story); FAULKNER, supra note 23, at 54-55 (“Instead [Marshall] excused the displacement 
which had occurred by the most narrow argument possible: the Indians’ war-like savagery made 
their physical proximity a mortal danger to the conquering settlers, and only to the extent of that 
danger might their lands be appropriated.”) (emphasis added). 
282. E.g., Lawrence R. Baca, Diversity and the Federal Bar Association, FED. LAW., Feb. 
2003, at 23, 27-28 (comparing United States v. Joseph, 94 U.S. 614 (1876), with United States v. 
Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913), where the Court came to opposite conclusions as to whether the 
Pueblo Indians were “Indian” as defined under federal law); Felix Cohen, Field Theory and 
Judicial Logic, 59 YALE L.J. 238, 263 (1950) (same). 
283. David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the 
Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1575 (1996) (quoting a memorandum from 
Justice Antonin Scalia to Justice William Brennan, Jr. (Apr. 4, 1990) (Duro v. Reina, U.S. 
Supreme Court No. 88-6546)). 
284. See H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659, 669 (1987). 
The originalist’s use of history is goal-directed: he wants to understand past thought 
and action in order to address present concerns. There is nothing wrong with this 
utilitarian interest in history, but it does pose a serious temptation for the interpreter. 
In his desire to mine something useful for his purposes, he easily may slip into the 
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one’s political views.  Consider then-Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in United 
States v. Sioux Nation.285  He could not resist asserting that the claims of the 
Sioux Nation to the Black Hills, a place as sacred as the Temple of 
Jerusalem, were undermined by the “villainy” of the Indians.286  Yes, the 
Americans employed “greed, cupidity, and other less-than-admirable 
tactics,”287 but the Indians were savages.  Quoting Morison: 
The Plains Indians seldom practiced agriculture or other primitive 
arts, but they were fine physical specimens; and in warfare, once 
they had learned the use of the rifle, [were] much more formidable 
than the Eastern tribes who had slowly yielded to the white man.  
Tribe warred with tribe, and a highly developed sign language was 
the only means of inter-tribal communication.  The effective unit 
 
fundamental historical error of ignoring the past’s essential autonomy. Put more 
concretely, the founders thought, argued, reached decisions, and wrote about the issues 
that mattered to them, not about our contemporary problems. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
But see Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Law and the Humanities: An Uneasy Relationship, 
18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 155, 165 (2006) (“Consider that neither of the two most prominent 
‘originalists’ on the United States Supreme Court—Justices Scalia and Thomas—has any 
professional training as historians, but that has not stopped them from criticizing their colleagues 
and others for failing to abide by what the framers meant.”); Morton J. Horwitz, Foreword—The 
Constitution of Change: Legal Fundamentality without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 30, 
70 (1993); William M. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 
1484 (1987) (“Indeed, the Court often manipulates originalist arguments to reach results that can 
better be supported by a dynamic view of the statute.”). 
[O]riginalist interpretations can be manipulated by a changing and dynamic time 
frame.  For example, after the Civil War, fluctuations in popular support for black 
aspirations or for Reconstruction among the political elite changed dramatically over 
time.  In such a dynamic and unfolding situation, the expressions of individual views 
on the scope or purpose of any broad or controversial provision can be expected to 
change rapidly.  Jefferson’s changing views on the scope of the First Amendment is 
such an example. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
Michael W. McConnell, Active Liberty: A Progressive Alternative to Textualism and 
Originalism?, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2415 (reviewing STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: 
INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005)). 
This is not, of course, to say that every judge claiming to follow a textualist or origi-
nalist approach will do so in an objective manner.  Texts can be misread and history 
can be manipulated; judges are human; power corrupts; and judges may be tempted to 
twist the sources to make the cases come out ‘the right way.’  The point is that in 
principle the textualist-originalist approach supplies an objective basis for judgment 
that does not merely reflect the judge’s own ideological stance.  And when errors are 
made, they can be identified as such, on the basis of professional, and not merely 
ideological, criteria.  Even in principle, constitutional interpretation based on the 
judge’s own assessment of worthy purposes and propitious consequences lacks that 
objectivity. 
Id. 
285. 448 U.S. 337 (1980). 
286. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. at 435 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
287. Id. 
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was the band or village of a few hundred souls, which might be 
seen in the course of its wanderings encamped by a water-course 
with tipis erected; or pouring over the plain, women and children 
leading dogs and packhorses with their trailing travois, while gaily 
dressed braves loped ahead on horseback.  They lived only for the 
day, recognized no rights of property, robbed or killed anyone if 
they thought they could get away with it, inflicted cruelty without a 
qualm, and endured torture without flinching.288 
Chief Justice Marshall’s view of history, as well as the rest of the 
members of the Marshall Court who wrote opinions in the Trilogy, was 
“lawyer’s history.”  “As one scholar noted, ‘lawyers’ histories force the past 
to yield an answer that can be stated as a legal rule, while academic 
historians, on the other hand, recognize that historical research generally 
offers only an incomplete, conflicting, or evolving process of historical 
development.’”289  In Professor Morton Horwitz’s criticism of “lawyer’s 
legal history,” he argued that these histories are “part of a politically 
conservative ideology of legalism that has prevailed in America from at 
least the post-revolutionary period and in England from the beginning of the 
seventeenth century.”290  Horwitz identified two elements of lawyer’s legal 
history: “the emphasis on continuity and the search for origins.”291  Chief 
Justice Marshall’s reiteration of history that the Doctrine of Discovery 
originated with the European powers constitutes this search for an origin to 
the rule reached in Johnson.  But Professor Banner’s work indicates that the 
on-the-ground reality of Indian land acquisition had little to do with the 
Doctrine of Discovery—the English purchased a huge portion of the East 
Coast without regard to the Doctrine of Discovery.  That the Doctrine of 
Discovery did become established law again by the mid-eighteenth century 
was inconvenient for Chief Justice Marshall’s view of a unitary and consis-
tent history—the kind of history a lawyer wants to see on the page.  History 
had to be fudged and so it was. 
The same was true for the history of the Cherokee Nation and all 
Indian tribes.  Never mind that Indian corn fields grew the highest corn ever 
 
288. Id. at 436-37 (quoting SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE 
AMERICAN PEOPLE 539-40 (1965)) (emphasis added). 
289. David M. Zlotnick, Justice Scalia and His Critics: An Exploration of Scalia’s Fidelity 
to His Constitutional Methodology, 48 EMORY L.J. 1377, 1409-10 (1999) (quoting William John 
Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment: Origins and Original Meaning, 602-1791, 1504 (1990) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School) (on file with UMI Dissertation 
Service) (quoted in George C. Thomas III, Remapping the Criminal Universe, 83 VA. L. REV. 
1819, 1827 n.35 (1997)). 
290. Horwitz, The Conservative Tradition, supra note 276, at 276. 
291. Id. 
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seen or that the Cherokee Nation was more than a match for the weak and 
poverty-stricken Georgia population in 1830.  Indians were weaker than the 
European conquerors from day one of discovery.  Well, never mind that so 
many of the European “conquerors” and “discoverers” would have perished 
but for the hospitality of local tribes.  Indians were weaker then and they 
were weaker by the time of the Marshall Trilogy.  They had to be, in Chief 
Justice Marshall’s view, in order to make the Doctrine of Discovery and the 
reading of “protection” as “dependency” palatable.  Never mind that Chief 
Justice Marshall himself wrote that the early days of the American Republic 
were filled with fear that the Indians would wipe out the entire nation. 
Reading the Trilogy as history is a mistake.  Reading the Trilogy as an 
exercise in lawyering is instructive.  The Trilogy is lawyer’s history, over-
simplified to make the holdings appear inevitable.  They’re good lawyering 
on the part of Chief Justice Marshall, but they did a major disservice to 
Indian tribes and to the Cherokee Nation.  By the time Chief Justice 
Marshall started to revise his history of the Cherokee Nation in Worcester, 
it was too late. 
B. THE TRILOGY AS LITERATURE 
If the Trilogy is not good history, then perhaps it is fiction?  Or 
literature?  Chief Justice Marshall wrote a good story.292  But in the Death 
of the Author, Roland Barthes wrote, “[W]riting is the destruction of every 
voice, of every point of origin.  Writing is that neutral, composite, oblique 
space where our subject slips away, the negative where all identity is lost, 
starting with the very identity of the body writing.”293  In the Cherokee 
 
292. But see Milner S. Ball, Stories of Origin and Constitutional Possibilities, 87 MICH. L. 
REV. 2280, 2296 (1989). 
No version of the American story gives full voice to Native Americans.  The Ameri-
can legal order debars the autonomy of tribes and the possibility of dialogue with them 
as independent centers of sovereignty.  This exclusion cannot be overcome in the 
received rhetorical manner by telling the story of American origins because that story 
simply entrenches the exclusion. 
Id. (citations omitted); see generally Kristen A. Carpenter, Contextualizing the Losses of Allotment 
Through Literature, 82 N.D. L. REV. 605 (2006). 
The need to contextualize legal rules is particularly acute in Federal Indian Law.  
Because the field originated in Anglo-American rather than tribal legal traditions, 
Federal Indian law is often alien and oppressive to its Indian constituents.  Moreover, 
many students and even practitioners of Indian law are not deeply informed about 
Indian people, cultures, and places.  As a result, lawyers sometimes fail to appreciate 
how Indian law cases affect Indian communities or how to represent Indian clients 
effectively.  At the very least, there is room for improvement in understanding Indian 
law and its impact on Indian people. 
Carpenter, supra, at 605 (footnotes omitted). 
293. Roland Barthes, The Death of the Author, excerpted in MODERN LITERARY THEORY: A 
READER, 114, 114 (Philip Rice & Patricia Waugh eds., 2d ed. 1992). 
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cases specifically and in the entire Trilogy in general, there are two 
deaths—there is the death of the author of the lead opinions, but there is 
also the death of the “subject,” the Cherokee Nation and all Indian tribes in 
the United States. 
Chief Justice Marshall (the first death) wrote the Trilogy to serve 
several purposes, as we understand them.  First, he wished to preserve the 
Union at a time when the Southern states were threatening succession and 
nullification of federal law.  Second, he wished to preserve the distance 
between Indian tribes and the nascent American Republic.  Third, according 
to Professor Robertson, he wished to protect the land interests in certain 
colonial militiamen. As a matter of literature, the purposes of the author are 
irrelevant according to Barthes: 
“Linguistically, the author is never more than the instance [of] 
writing, just as I is nothing other than the instance of saying I: 
language knows a ‘subject,’ not a ‘person,’ and this subject, empty 
outside of the very enunciation which defines it, suffices to make 
language ‘hold together’, suffices, that is to say, exhausts it.”294 
And so it is with the writing of Supreme Court opinions.  The Trilogy exists 
and says many things, but the readers of that Trilogy—and future 
interpreters of those words—may read into (or out of) the Trilogy other 
things.  The legacy of the Trilogy has been mixed.  Chief Justice Marshall’s 
attempt to preserve the Union worked, to the extent that President Jackson 
sought to enforce federal law against the Southern states in late 1832, but 
only for another 19 years.  The Chief Justice’s attempt to preserve the 
distance between the Indians and the Americans was a resounding failure—
within days of the Worcester opinion.  While Indian tribes and their treaties 
often remain on American soil and extant, one has to wonder how much 
responsibility the Trilogy has for their survival.295 
As for the Cherokee Nation and the rest of the Indian nations (the 
second death), the period of removing all Indian nations to areas west of the 
Mississippi River began in earnest, in part, as a result of the language used 
by Chief Justice Marshall in the Trilogy.  He labeled tribes in Cherokee 
Nation as residing in a “state of pupilage,” and, from his vantage point, 
asserted that Indian tribes were “wards” of the federal government’s 
 
294. Barthes, supra note 293, at 116. 
295. But see CHARLES F. WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE RISE OF MODERN INDIAN 
NATIONS (2005) [hereinafter WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE] (tracing the survival of Indian 
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“guardian.”296  President Jackson’s farewell address echoed Chief Justice 
Marshall’s sentiment, but the meaning was far different: 
This unhappy race—the original dwellers in our land—are now 
placed in a situation where we may well hope that they will share 
in the blessings of civilization and be saved from that degradation 
and destruction to which they were rapidly hastening while they 
remained in the States; and while the safety and comfort of our 
own citizens have been greatly promoted by their removal, the 
philanthropist will rejoice that the remnant of that ill-fated race has 
been at length place beyond the reach of injury or oppression, and 
that the paternal care of the General Government will hereafter 
watch over them and protect them.297 
All discussion of the political stability, the farm surpluses, the success, and 
everything of the Cherokee polity in northwest Georgia was lost by 
Jackson’s 1837 farewell address.  President Jackson’s invocation of the 
federal government’s obligation to “protect” Indian tribes is a vicious 
parody of the way the word was used in the Cherokee treaties and in the 
Worcester opinion.  By the 1870s, federal officials were referring to Indian 
treaties as “a mere form to amuse and quiet savages, a half-compassionate, 
half-contemptuous humoring of unruly children.”298  Indian nations, and the 
Cherokee Nation, died in the Trilogy’s interpretation as well.  Chief Justice 
Marshall’s interpretation of Indian nations and Indian people “spill[ed] over 
constantly in to the works clustered around it, generating a hundred 
different perspectives which dwindle to vanishing point.”299  The Trilogy’s 
hopes for Indian nations (such as they were) could not survive the “cultural 
moment”300 of later phases of federal Indian policy—removal, assimilation, 
and termination.301 
C. THE TRILOGY AS AMERICAN MYTH 
Whatever the intent of the authors and whatever the impact of the 
Trilogy, another purpose the Trilogy serves is to help justify the ongoing 
 
296. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1832). 
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298. FRANCIS A. WALKER, THE INDIAN QUESTION 8 (1874), quoted in PRUCHA, supra note 
297, at 16. 
299. TERRY EAGLETON, LITERARY THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 119 (2d ed. 1996). 
300. Edward Said, From Opponents, Audiences, Constituencies and Community, in MODERN 
LITERARY THEORY, supra note 293, at 249, 249. 
301. See generally Fletcher, The Supreme Court and Federal Indian Policy, supra note 240. 
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expansion of the United States through the dispossession of Indian lands—
the Trilogy as American Myth.  The English brought the theory that natural 
law compelled the expansion of the Empire because the English believed 
that “displacement of savagery by civilization was both inevitable and 
proper. . . .”302  The Americans, who completed this conquest, expanded 
upon that arrogance by “w[inning] the Indian wars.”303  This even makes its 
way into modern American political discussion, for example, as “some non-
Indians’ desire to maintain the federal public lands as a symbol of American 
conquest over the west and its original indigenous inhabitants.”304 
Colonialism nonetheless requires something more than the mere 
conquering and annexing of foreign lands.  It also includes a men-
tal state of both the conqueror and the conquered.  Historian D. K. 
Fieldhouse elaborated on the necessary mental state for a colonial 
regime.  He noted that a key “basis of imperial authority [is] the 
mental attitude of the colonist.”  His acceptance of subordina-
tion—whether through a positive sense of common interest with 
the parent state, or through inability to conceive of any 
alternative—makes the empire durable.  The durability of the 
empire is sustained on both sides, that of the rulers and that of the 
distant ruled, and, in turn, each has a set of interpretations of their 
common history with their own perspective, historical sense, 
emotions, and traditions.305 
One of the most quoted phrases in the Trilogy is Chief Justice 
Marshall’s claim, “Conquest gives a title which the Courts of the conqueror 
cannot deny . . . .”306  This phrase has been quoted by legal commentators 
and courts hundreds of times and has become part of the language of 
American Indian law.307  In fact, one could argue that it is part of the 
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language of the American myth of victory and destiny.  As Walter 
McDougall wrote, “So, who are we, we Americans? . . .  We’re a jealous 
people who react ferociously against all who dare interfere with our pursuit 
of happiness.”308 
The American myth adopted by the Supreme Court in the Trilogy 
renders the continuing depredation of Indian legal interests more palatable 
to even the most sympathetic of observers.  One commentator argued that 
older Indian land claims should not be compensable because modern 
history (read: the American myth) justifies the taking of Indian lands in 
exactly the way it happened: 
[F]or any given historical period, there is simply no reliable way to 
untangle which property holdings or transactions were tainted by 
actionable wrongdoing and which (if any) were not.  Thus, given 
what Jeremy Waldron has aptly called the “contagion of injustice,” 
no genuine attempt at full-scale rectification could be limited to 
those who directly engaged in overtly unjust acts of appropriation, 
particularly in a market-based system of exchange in which the 
impact of one transaction is communicated via the price system 
throughout the economy. 
It follows that the ubiquity of past acts of injustice, coupled with 
the pervasive effects that such acts have over extended periods of 
time, makes it reasonable to assume that the material well-being of 
all living persons has been both enhanced and harmed in varying 
degrees by past acts of wrongdoing.  Indeed, as many commen-
tators have pointed out, as a practical matter, it is highly unlikely 
that anyone alive today would even exist but for the actual course 
of historical events.309 
In other words, for all those settlers who went west and made names for 
themselves through adventure and bravery (and violence and duplicity, too), 
none of it would have happened if Indian lands weren’t dispossessed.  This, 
of course, is another way of saying the “courts of the conqueror” cannot 
intervene in the dispossession of Indian lands.  But the American myth 
made dispossession of Indian lands inevitable.  Indian political strength was 
(and is) unthinkable: 
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On June 25, 1876, at the Battle of the Little Bighorn, the combined 
Indian forces of Sioux and Cheyenne warriors killed over half of 
the army troopers in the Seventh Cavalry Regiment.  This Indian 
victory spawned a wave of American vengeance against any tribe 
that resisted settlement on a reservation under the watchful eye of 
federal troops. 
Resymbolized as unfeeling, bloodthirsty savages who understood 
and respected only greater cruelty than they could inflict, the 
Indian peoples were successfully recharacterized by the federal 
government in a new light.  No longer the impulsive, willful child 
who had to be placated with flowery promises and cheap trinkets, 
the Indian had been recast as the malevolent “other.”  It was he—
the treacherous, unscrupulous red-devil who raped white women 
for pleasure and burned wagon trains for entertainment—who 
merited extermination if he refused to settle on the reservation.  It 
was he who would be forever engraved on the American 
consciousness as symbolizing the uncontrollable, and therefore 
dangerous, aspects of an uncivilized human nature.  It was he who 
would be endlessly shot, stabbed, hung, starved, dismembered, 
buried or burned alive, without a tear shed, in those countless 
popular western melodramas passed off as the “dime novel” 
American epic of the Winning of the West.310 
The American Myth, adopted as Supreme Court legend in the Trilogy, 
cannot coexist with tribal sovereignty and self-determination in this light. 
The genius of the Trilogy—the genius of John Marshall—was incorporating 
that myth into the Supreme Court’s nascent history.  As American domi-
nance over the continent grew, so did the Court’s legitimacy. 
D. THE TRILOGY AS ECONOMIC CASE STUDY 
Professor Eric Kades made an interesting and powerful argument that 
the dispossession of Indian lands by the European and then the American 
governments was done in the most efficient means possible, saving untold 
millions in extra land purchase costs.311  According to Kades: 
The rule of M’Intosh was part and parcel of a larger process: effi-
cient (cheap) European expropriation of Indian lands. Just as many 
 
310. Raymond Cross, Tribes as Rich Nations, 79 OR. L. REV. 893, 905-06 (2000) (footnotes 
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contract, tort, property, and other legal rules promote efficient 
behavior, M’Intosh and a broad range of other colonial and early 
American laws created rewards and penalties that helped 
Europeans obtain Indian lands as inexpensively as possible.  It is 
important to stress that the process minimized costs for European 
colonizers, not for the colonizers and Indians together.  This is in 
contrast with most efficient legal rules that, ex ante at least, benefit 
all participants in a given activity.312 
But, alas, the Doctrine of Discovery and the other rules used by Euro-
Americans to divest Indians of their lands benefited everyone but the 
Indians.  The efficiency—the “neat solution” to the problem of a free-for-all 
in Indian land speculation—was to “establish[] the United States as the sole 
purchasing entity.”313  A Pareto-superior result—“a change in allocations 
that left at least one person better off and no one worse off”314—could not 
be and was not achieved under this legal regime.  Perhaps the result fulfills 
the Kaldor-Hicks criteria, whereby “a move is efficient whenever the 
winners win more than the losers lose. . . .”315  The value of the land 
generated after the sale to the American government (and then to American 
citizens and corporations) far, far exceeded the cost of the purchase of the 
land for the Americans at the time of sale,316 to the direct detriment of the 
Indians.  But that was okay from an economic perspective, since the 
Indians’ valuation of the land had no significant value that an economist 
could measure.317 
The efficiency argument Kades makes has a great deal of logical 
power, but it has flaws and weaknesses and, ultimately, fails.  One funda-
mental flaw with Professor Kades’ thesis is that it draws conclusions, based 
on the historical evidence, that are debatable and impossible to prove.  
Consider the outcome if Johnson had been decided the other way, that the 
first bona fide purchasers acquired title that was superior (Indian title) to the 
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later bona fide purchasers (the federal government interest).  Why is this 
hypothetical result less efficient than the actual result? 
Kades’ thesis fails if viewed in this light.  Kades argues that the land 
speculators making direct deals with Indians and Indian tribes would have 
competed with other land speculators, driving up the cost of land purchase 
in a classic prisoners’ dilemma.318  He asserts, “The United Companies 
[parties to the Johnson case], for instance, faced no rivals for the lands they 
sought to purchase, but had they earned fat profits, more competitors would 
inevitably have begun bidding for Indian lands.”319  But this ignores the 
established fact that everyone with a little bit of capital had been specu-
lating in Indian lands since before the Revolutionary War.  Horace Hagan 
reported: 
The United States had experienced several periods of ardent land 
speculation.  Never, however, has such a frenzy of land specula-
tion gripped the entire country as in the days immediately 
following the acknowledgement of the independence of the 
colonies.  From the highest to the lowest—from Washington him-
self to the humblest mechanic—speculation in the newly-acquired 
and unsettled Western lands was rife.  The Mississippi Bubble was 
repeating itself.  In such speculations, the vast fortune of Robert 
Morris, of Revolutionary fame, was swept away.  By such specu-
lations, the judicial ermine of that great statesman and jurist, James 
Wilson, was smirched.  The frenzy was confined to no particular 
portion of the country.  Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and South 
Carolina were alike afire with the same fever.320 
Even decades after the “frenzy” of land speculation began, speculators—
many of them American officials—like the parties in Johnson were buying 
Indian lands for bottom dollar prices.  And a good portion of these specu-
lators were the people in power in the American government, a point not 
valued by Kades’ efficiency analysis.  Professor Banner reports: 
Many American officials themselves were investors in Western 
lands.  In an era before there were many business corporations, 
western land was the main speculative investment available in 
North America.  Anyone with money and a taste for risk, including 
government officials, found western land attractive.  Their interest 
was in acquiring land quickly and cheaply from the Indians so it 
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could be resold at a profit, which was exactly the interest of the 
settlers on the frontier, the people to whom the speculators hoped 
to sell the land.  That had also been true before the Revolution, but 
then the power of American officials had been checked by the 
imperial government, which was staffed by men far less likely to 
have invested their money in western land.321 
Given these facts, a theory, at least as plausible as Kades’ thesis, is that the 
establishment of the rule in Johnson eliminated one purchaser—the 
itinerant land speculator—in favor of another—the federal government and 
its officials who stood to gain from the elimination of all other speculators’ 
interests.  The Johnson rule probably valued the land speculator with 
greater political ties to the federal government and its officials than the 
average speculator trailblazing through the woods and buying land from the 
Indians he or she encountered.  This is one reason why Kades’ thesis does 
not demonstrate why vesting title to Indian lands to the federal government 
as opposed to the Indians produced the more efficient result. 
A second flaw in Kades’ thesis is that it works, if at all, only for lands 
east of the Mississippi River.  East of the river, “agriculture was the princi-
pal commercial activity . . . [and p]rivate property was thus well 
established . . . .”322  Where private property regimes were established, the 
transaction costs to purchasing land were lower and similar to the kind of 
land purchase contemplated by the Johnson rule, with Creek and Cherokee 
towns exemplifying this regime.323  But west of the river: 
[L]and and the resources on it were effectively a vast commons, 
because benefits of private ownership were less than for agricul-
tural tribes, and the costs of enforcing any land claims compara-
tively great . . . .  More often than in the east, whites in the west 
found tribes with no effective ownership of land; the only rights 
were usufruct and obtained by capture and possession.324 
Anderson and McChesney, whose work inspired Kades’ thesis in part,325 
imply that conquest (that is, violence) was a more efficient means of 
establishing property ownership in non-Indians west of the River.326 
 
321. BANNER, supra note 32, at 124. 
322. Anderson & McChesney, supra note 316, at 61-62. 
323. See id. at 62 (citing ANGIE DEBO, A HISTORY OF THE INDIANS OF THE UNITED STATES 
13-14 (1989)). 
324. Id. 
325. Kades, Dark Side, supra note 311, at 1072. 
326. Anderson & McChesney, supra note 316, at 63-64. 
       
690 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 82:627 
Professor Douglas Allen fills in the blanks in that analysis by arguing 
that the United States’ promotion of homesteading was an efficient means 
of settling the West.327  According to Allen: 
By instigating homesteading, the U.S. government restricted the 
choices of settlers by providing an incentive to rush to one area.  
The sudden arrival of tens of thousands of people destroyed much 
of the Indian way of life and forced Indian tribes to accept res-
ervation life or join the Union.  The selective and intensive settle-
ment caused by homesteading also reduced the cost of defending 
any given settlement.328 
What Allen describes is not the application of the Johnson rule, but a policy 
of the federal government of forced confrontation between settlers (backed 
by the Seventh Cavalry) and the Indians by encouraging encroachment onto 
Indian lands through treaty violations. Kades downplays the violence of the 
Indian-white relations in the West,329 but homesteading often was an inten-
tional incitement to violence, what Kades calls the way of Machiavelli—or 
the inefficient way.330  Anderson and McChesney supply this analysis: 
As the zone of controversy shifted westward, however, much of 
the growing Indian-white violence could be traced to agency costs 
that made negotiated outcomes unenforceable.  Most treaty viola-
tions were committed “not by leaders of the United States or of the 
Indian tribes but rather by members of these groups who could not 
be controlled by the leadership, or more accurately, who could be 
controlled only at extremely high cost . . . . 
*** 
Treaties signed in good faith by white politicians proved to be 
unenforceable, as individual whites violated them with impu-
nity . . . .  The problem lay with the national government’s inabil-
ity to defend local property rights against local white citizens—a 
difficulty described as “a massive principal-agent problem.”   . . . 
Also, government employees were notoriously faithless agents, 
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frequently depriving Indians of the consideration due them under 
treaties.  Reservation Indians’ raiding local white settlements was 
frequently viewed not as a treaty violation but as self-help in the 
face of whites’ breach of contract in failing to deliver monetary 
and in-kind payments promised under treaties.331 
Given these factors, how was federal ownership of Indian lands (the 
Johnson rule) more efficient?  If the Indians retained title to their lands, 
they would have sold the lands as they saw fit to the non-Indians, 
represented by the United States in accordance with the Nonintercourse 
Acts.332  No one ever complains about the Indians breaking every treaty 
ever signed.  As Professor Rob Williams showed in comprehensive detail, 
Indians respected treaties and, to this day, seek only to enforce them.333  
One could make a plausible argument that recognizing Indian title in Indian 
lands would have nullified the need for homesteading or violence or threat 
of military force.  Kades would be hard pressed to find histories of Indian 
tribes who ceded their lands, only to come back later and demand those 
lands back by threatening violence.  It makes no logical sense to conclude 
that federal government ownership of Indian lands was more efficient than 
tribal ownership of Indian lands.  But it makes more logical sense that 
conflict and transaction costs increase dramatically when one party to a land 
sale (the United States) asserts a highly doubtful and probably illegitimate 
interest in land in comparison to a land sale where the sellers and the buyers 
both agree that the sellers own the land.  As Anderson and McChesney 
argue, “For trade to occur, property rights must be well specified and 
divestible, and agreements enforceable.  Otherwise, increased transaction 
costs will reduce the surplus from negotiation and increase the likelihood of 
conflict.”334 
The transaction costs in the “efficient” world Kades describes (which is 
what actually happened) would seem to be higher than in the alternative 
world.  In the Kades world, the United States negotiators do not believe that 
their negotiating partners, the Indians, retain title to their lands.  At worst, 
they treat the negotiations as a joke or a salve to placate the Indians; at best, 
they drive a hard bargain on price, safe in the knowledge that the Indians 
don’t have a leg to stand on in terms of title or that the Indians would soon 
die off from disease or starvation.  After the sale, the United States and the 
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American citizens still don’t think the Indians own title to the land they 
retain, so they tend to disrespect the borders of retained Indian lands.  
Moreover, because they sold the land for such a low price and under other 
harsh terms, the Indians’ welfare declines.  Conflict ensues, with the 
Americans feeling righteously indignant because they know that the Indians 
don’t own the land they’re claiming.  The Indians, having nothing to lose, 
fight to extermination.  Kades, somehow, argues that this is the more 
efficient outcome. 
In the alternate world, where the Johnson rule is reversed, despite 
Kades’ thesis, transaction costs would be lower or, at worst, equivalent.  In 
this world, the United States negotiators treat the negotiations as real, as a 
legitimate attempt to reach a meeting of the minds.  The land purchase 
agreements are more evenly weighted, with higher prices for the land and 
better terms, allowing the Indians to better fend for themselves on their 
retained lands.  Federal officials, one would hope, respect the land interests 
of the Indians more because they own their land.  The “measured 
separatism”335 of the time could come to fruition, in theory, depending on 
the Americans’ willingness to quench their greed and attitudes toward 
expansion. 
Kades’ thesis suffers from one last problem.  Kades’ thesis could be 
restated as this: (1) Americans and their government did not believe Indians 
were competent enough, or trustworthy enough, or likely to engage in land 
sale transactions; (2) an efficient way to ensure that non-Indians recognize 
amongst themselves the property interests acquired from Indians is to agree 
to a system of rules amongst themselves (the Johnson rule); and (3) use 
violence, homesteading, and whatever other means necessary to enforce 
those rules against the Indians.  Kades argues that this system was the most 
efficient way to dispossess Indian land holdings from the Indians.  The first 
part of this restatement is implicit in every portion of Kades’ Dark Side 
article—that Indians were incompetent, not trustworthy, and wouldn’t sell 
their lands as often as the non-Indians wanted.  This was the “problem” of 
the American frontier for every American administration well into the 
twentieth century.  The underlying assumption of Kades’ efficiency thesis 
and every other argument in favor of dispossessing Indian tribes of their 
lands is that the Indians were inferior. 
In sum, Kades’ thesis is a mere justification, via superficial efficiency 
and historical analysis, of the “lawyer’s history” of Indian lands dispos-
session as it occurred.  It’s impossible to disprove because the American 
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government precluded any other option with which to compare, thanks to 
the Johnson rule.  And a thesis that cannot be disproved is no thesis at all.336 
Regardless of the merits of Kades’ thesis and my rebuttal, the 
discussion allows for students of Indian law to become acquainted with the 
rise of law and economics in the academy and, to some extent, in the 
practice of law.  Even the conquest of Indian lands lends itself, for some, to 
an efficiency analysis.  Moreover, the increased use of efficiency analysis 
has brought a return to the calls for breaking up Indian reservation lands 
and allotting them to individual Indians.337  From one disaster to another. 
E. THE TRILOGY AS CANON AND ANTI-CANON 
A final assessment of the Trilogy requires the answer to the question of 
whether the Trilogy should be studied at all.  In short, yes, the Trilogy 
should be studied.  But the Trilogy is a study in contradiction.  Depending 
on one’s point of view or political leanings, portions of the Trilogy—
whether they be the direct holdings, Chief Justice Marshall’s dicta, or even 
portions of the opinions of the other Justices—are part of the canon of 
American Indian law, even American law.338  Worcester often fits in with 
Marbury,339 Justice Holmes’ dissent in Abrams v. United States,340 and 
Brown v. Board.341  Other portions or even the same portions may be, for 
others, part of the anti-canon of American Indian law.  Johnson v. M’Intosh 
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& MARY L. REV. 1321, 1326-27 (2002); Gerard N. Magliocca, Preemptive Opinions: The Secret 
History of Worcester v. Georgia and Dred Scott, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 487, 487, 496 (2002). 
339. Marbury v. Madison, 5. U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
340. 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
341. 347 U.S. 438 (1954). 
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is listed with Dred Scott,342 Plessy,343 and Lochner.344  For others, the 
Trilogy is both at the same time, sort of an older Roe v. Wade,345 reaching 
proper results, but butchering the law in order to do so.346 
The Trilogy is a microcosm of the contradictions of federal Indian law.  
There are no clear winners or losers.  Consider Santa Clara Pueblo v. 
Martinez.347  In my sex discrimination class in law school, Professor 
Catharine MacKinnon described Martinez as one of the few times the 
Supreme Court upheld tribal sovereignty, but they did so at the expense of a 
woman and her children.348 
So it goes with the Trilogy.  The seeds of federal government 
recognition of tribal sovereignty are there, but so are the seeds of state 
intrusion into Indian Country.  So much derives from the Trilogy that Vine 
Deloria and Clifford Lytle remarked, “Marshall’s views in [Worcester] 
established the foundation upon which much of the idea of federal 
responsibility over Indian affairs is built.”349  While there is no doubt that 
the Trilogy is the foundation of federal Indian law, there is a great deal of 
dispute over whether tribal advocates should even rely upon (read: 
legitimize) the Trilogy.350  But there is another view, as suggested by 
Professor Frank Pommersheim: 
I think one of the ways of reading and thinking about the Marshall 
trilogy is as suggesting a compact theory.  Such a theory suggests 
that there is a meaningful and almost equal, perhaps even equal, 
relationship between the federal government and Indian tribes.  
One of the themes I think you find in treaties is that they represent 
a compact between two sovereign groups of peoples, even if not 
 
342. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). 
343. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
344. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
345. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
346. E.g., John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE 
L.J. 920 (1973).  Cf. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959) (making a similar argument about Brown v. Board). 
347. 436 U.S. 49 (1978). 
348. See generally CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Whose Culture? A Case Note on Martinez 
v. Santa Clara Pueblo, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 63 (1987).  But 
see generally Rina Swentzell, Testimony of a Santa Clara Woman, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 97 
(2004); Gloria Valencia-Weber, Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez: Twenty-five Years of Disparate 
Cultural Visions, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 49 (2004).  Cf. Angela R. Riley, Santa Clara 
Pueblo: Tribal Sovereignty in a Post-9/11 World, 82 N.D. L. REV. 953 (2006). 
349. DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 48, at 30. 
350. E.g., WILLIAMS, LIKE A LOADED WEAPON, supra note 273; Robert B. Porter, The 
Meaning of Indigenous Nation Sovereignty, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 75 (2002); Robert B. Porter, A 
Proposal to the Hanodaganyas to Decolonize Federal Indian Control Law, 31 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 899 (1999). 
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equal in terms of power.  An essential part of that compact was the 
recognition of mutual sovereignty.  There really are two sover-
eigns standing on each side of the manifold set of treaties made 
between Indian tribes and the federal government.  In the Marshall 
trilogy—and this is where I think the crux of Indian law is today—
there is a critical reading of Cherokee Nation and Worcester that 
describes a compact between the tribes and the federal 
government.351 
Students should realize at the outset that the Trilogy is both boon and 
anathema.  And reasonable and intelligent minds can differ on the question. 
IV. CONCLUSION—THE DANGERS OF READING THE TRILOGY 
TOO CLOSELY 
Despite the breadth of this essay, it would be a mistake to depend too 
much on the Trilogy—or to blame too much on the Trilogy.  The best 
appellate advocates know that the oral argument before the Supreme Court 
or other appellate courts is a conversation with the Justices or the judges, a 
conversation intended to persuade, not to instruct.  In the context of federal 
Indian law, it appears that in order to win a case before the Supreme Court, 
tribal advocates must demonstrate that the tribal interest implicates an 
important constitutional concern.352  Tribal interests almost always bump up 
against state or local government interests, or federal government interests, 
or private, non-Indian interests.353  For the Court, as it has always been, 
these non-tribal interests are very important.  It is tempting to quote 
Worcester’s assertion that state law has no “force” in Indian Country354 to 
 
351. Frank Pommersheim, Democracy, Citizenship, and Indian Law Literacy: Some Initial 
Thoughts, 14 T. M. COOLEY L. REV. 457, 458-59 (1997) (footnotes omitted). 
352. Contra Lawrence Lessig, How I Lost the Big One, LEGAL AFF., Mar.-Apr. 2004, at 57, 
59. 
Our case had been supported from the very beginning by an extraordinary lawyer, 
Geoffrey Stewart, and by the law firm he had moved to, Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue.  
There were three key lawyers on the case from Jones Day.  Stewart was the first; then, 
Dan Bromberg and Don Ayer became quite involved.  Bromberg and Ayer had a 
common view about how this case would be won: We would only win, they repeatedly 
told me, if we could make the issue seem ‘important’ to the Supreme Court.  It had to 
seem as if dramatic harm were being done to free speech and free culture; otherwise, 
the justices would never vote against “the most powerful media companies in the 
world.” 
Id. 
353. E.g., Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi Nation, 546 U.S. 95 (2005) (tribe versus 
state); City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197 (2005) (tribe versus state and local 
government and private individuals); United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488 (2003) (tribe 
versus federal government); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001) (tribe and tribal member 
versus state official). 
354. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 561 (1832). 
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the Supreme Court, but such an assertion doesn’t implicate an important 
constitutional concern.  In Worcester, it did—federalism.  But in the 
modern Court, when the Justices do not want to respond to the Worcester 
argument, there is nothing that would compel them to355—except for an 
important constitutional concern.  In other words, the Trilogy alone is 
meaningless to a tribal advocate arguing before the Court. 
There’s a lot of great language in the Trilogy that supports tribal 
advocates and a lot of language that supports those who oppose tribal 
interests for whatever reason, but to place a client’s interests on the slender 
reed of the Trilogy is no longer an option.  In other words, read the Trilogy 
closely, but don’t bring the Trilogy with you when you’re facing Chief 
Justice Roberts.  It is a useful thing for a student to know that advocacy is 
more than iterating precedent to the Court. 
To return to the metaphor of the 200-year-old house described in 
Louise Erdrich’s poem, The Ritual, the Marshall Trilogy houses the 
foundation of federal Indian law.  This house’s many rooms contain the 
various doctrines of law that form the substance of federal Indian law, but 
200-year-old homes do not age well unless they are updated and retrofitted 
to include the newest improvements in housing technology.  The house that 
is the Marshall Trilogy does not appear to have been improved.  Instead, 
new rooms have been added to the core, a core that is still aging and rotting 
away.  And no matter how nice the new rooms might be, it is always cold 
inside the core of that house, an iron cold of the deepest night. 
Miigwetch. 
 
 
355. See JED RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY 5 (2005) (“In constitutional law . . . 
there are no such overarching interpretive precepts or protocols.  There are no official interpretive 
rules at all.”).  But see Lessig, supra note 352, at 62. 
I first scoured the majority opinion, written by Ginsburg, looking for how the court 
would distinguish the principle in this case from the principle in Lopez.  The reasoning 
was nowhere to be found.  The case was not even cited.  The core argument of our 
case did not even appear in the court’s opinion.  I couldn’t quite believe what I was 
reading.  I had said that there was no way this court could reconcile limited powers 
with the commerce clause and unlimited powers with the progress clause.  It had never 
even occurred to me that they could reconcile the two by not addressing the argument 
at all. 
Id. 
